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Introduction 
 
Public-private Partnership, a specific form of task fulfillment of administrations, has 
become increasingly popular over the last few years in many parts of the world as 
well as in Austria. 
 
A public-private partnership can be seen as an alternative to conventional public 
sector procurement1. In traditional public sector procurement, the public 
administration determines specifications and design of the infrastructure facility. 
Then, after bidding, a private-sector contractor is paid for construction of the facility. 
In a public-private partnership, however, the government specifies only the outputs, 
which are to be provided by the infrastructure facility. Though, it does not specify how 
these outputs should be supplied. The private firm/consortium manages and carries 
out the project. It receives payments (set already ex ante) over the life of the PPP-
contract, which are supposed to repay the funding costs and create a return for the 
investors.2 
 
In the context of my thesis I want to describe public-private partnerships as a 
Principal-Agent relationship. The private partner (agent) does not pursue community 
interest, however his personal’s. As a result, risks arise for the public partner 
(principal) on establishing a relationship with the private firm. There are two 
theoretical approaches that can be applied to public-private partnerships, focusing on 
strategic interactions between the partners. On one hand the contract is likely to be 
incomplete and thus the relationship can be described by means of transaction costs 
theory and theory of incomplete contracts, respectively. On the other hand, assuming 
complete contracts, the partnership can be described as a classic Principal-Agent 
relationship where the existence of information asymmetries causes distorting 
phenomena like moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The public administration has to provide adequate incentives to the private 
consortium in order to ensure ex ante the efficient realization of the stipulated 
service.  
                                                 
1 See page 7 for a description of this term based on its use in my work. 
2 See Yescombe (2007), p. 4 
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I want to describe those incentive issues in public-private partnerships and find out if 
PPP arrangement yields more efficient results than traditional public sector 
procurement. 
 
Basics of Public Private Partnership 
 
Public-private Partnerships are not a new phenomenon, since there are examples 
going back decades from now. The current trend of governments contracting private 
entities to provide services, however, formally began about 1992 in Great Britain 
when the government wanted to use private funding as a subsitute for public-sector 
investment. At the beginning, the British projects, called private finance initiatives 
(PFIs), were concentrated in the transportation sector. Nowadays they are also used 
in many other areas. 3 
A survey, conducted by Torres and Pina (2001) shows that an important part (more 
than 30%) of the services provided by the larger EU local governments are provided 
under PPP.4  
 
Definition and disambiguation 
 
Projects we name “public-private partnerships” are conducted in many different 
areas, e.g. transport, housing, urban development, urban regeneration, operating 
cultural institutions, area of education etc.  
Because the term public-private partnership is used with too many different 
meanings, I cannot determine an exact and universally valid definition. In literature 
one can find various definitions of public-private partnership (PPP).  
 
Even the European Commission in its Green Paper on PPP’s does not bring up a 
clear definition:5 “The term public-private partnership ("PPP") is not defined at 
Community level. In general, the term refers to forms of cooperation between public 
authorities and the world of business which aim to ensure the funding, construction, 
                                                 
3 See e.g. de Bettignies and Ross (2004), p. 136 or Grout (1997), pp. 56-59 
4 See Torres and Pina (2003), p.? 
5 See Green paper (2004), p. 3 
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renovation, management or maintenance of an infrastructure or the provision of a 
service.” 
 
Kouwenhoven (1993) has proposed following definition of public-private partnership: 
“One can speak of public-private partnership if there is an interaction between the 
public administration and a private partner, if the achievement of converging 
objectives is brought into focus, if synergy effects are developed by achieving this 
proposes, if these objectives have both a social and a commercial character and if 
responsibility and identity of the partners endure.”6 
An example of converging objectives can be that of reducing criminality. 
 
According to Budäus und Gründing (1997), public-private partnership is defined in a 
narrower sense through the following properties: 
 
o Interaction between public administration and actors from the private sector 
o Focusing on achievement of converging objectives 
o Potential of synergies through cooperation 
o Process orientation 
o The partner’s identity and responsibility endure 
o Cooperation relationship is stipulated7 
 
Budäus (2006) most of all emphasizes the permanent need of coordination during 
the contract period and the unstructured initial situation, respectively, as a crucial 
characteristic of public-private partnerships. As a result of the long contract period 
(about 30 years) it is not possible to set the particular rights, liabilities, costs, 
accomplishments and risks in advance. 8 
 
Budäus and Gröning (1997) especially point out the difference between a PPP and 
other contracts where conflicting goals exist among the partners. As examples for 
this they mention contracting out and leasing. The term contracting out describes 
forms of cooperation between public administration and private partners whose 
                                                 
6See Kouwenhoven (1993), p. 120 
7See Budäus und Grüning (1997), p.54 
8See Budäus (2006), p. 15  
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typical characteristic is that the private partner is not interested in performance of the 
service itself, but in the resulting revenues. 9 
 
An important point to isolate public-private partnerships from other forms of 
cooperation is the incompleteness of the contracts, which implies a constant need of 
cooperation and coordination.10  
 
 
In order to better understand the term public-private partnership it is interesting to 
compare it with other forms of cooperation between the public and the private sector. 
Schäffer and Loveridge (2002) distinguish crudely 4 forms of public-private 
cooperation. At this they focus on projects that should promote economic 
development. The election of the appropriate form of public-private cooperation 
depends on the distribution of risks, the expected benefits, and on the level of identity 
of interests.  
 
 
                                                 
 
9See  Budäus und Grüning (1997), p. 51 
6See Budäus(2006), p. 15 
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Table 111: Characteristics of Different Forms of PPC 
 Leader-Follower Buyer-Seller Joint Venture Partnership 
Purpose 
Likely to be 
specific (e.g. 
investing to 
stimulate private 
redevelopment of 
a neighborhood) 
Limited, specific 
(e.g., business 
recruitment) 
Limited and 
specific (e.g., 
construction and 
/or operation or a 
facility) 
Broad, general 
open ended (e.g., 
planning a strategy 
for the 
redevelopment of 
a neighborhood) 
Decision making 
Independent 
(leader), 
dependent/ 
conditional 
(follower) 
Negotiated and 
competitive 
Coordinated or 
joint, cooperative 
may also be 
egalitarian 
Joint, cooperative, 
and egalitarian 
Rewards Individual 
Individual, 
distribution 
depends on 
market strengths 
(which determine 
clout in negotiation 
the terms of the 
cooperation) 
Shared, usually 
string correlation 
between rewards 
of participants 
Shared, strong 
correlation 
between rewards 
of partners 
Risks Individual but correlated, limited 
Individual, 
distribution 
depends on 
sequencing of 
actions (those who 
have to act first 
face the highest 
risk) and market 
strengths (which 
determine clout in 
negotiation the 
terms of the 
cooperation), 
limited 
Shared, usually 
unevenly; 
distribution of 
risk(s) depends on 
agreement that 
establishes the 
joint venture; 
strong correlation 
between risks of all 
participants, 
limited 
Shared, usually 
unevenly 
distributed but 
strongly correlated, 
limited or unlimited 
Formal 
agreement 
Depends on size 
of necessary 
investment by the 
leader 
Depends on 
complexity of 
transaction 
Yes Yes 
Duration 
Limited, short to 
long (most likely 
short do medium) 
Individual 
exchange 
relationship or 
almost always 
limited, but pursuit 
of purpose is often 
open ended; short 
to medium, 
depending on 
complexity of 
transaction 
Limited or open 
ended; medium to 
long, depending on 
the complexity of 
the project 
Open ended, long 
 
 
According to Schäffer and Loveridge (2002), a public-private partnership is defined 
as an open ended agreement of cooperation. The partners determine the 
fundamental objective of the partnership, but at the same time they are open for new 
                                                 
11 Schaeffer and Loveridge 2002), p. 184 
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developments and possibilities. Furthermore they point out that partnerships between 
public authorities and private firms are relatively rare in consequence of the high 
requirements of an ideal partnership. Long-term partnerships are more probable 
when there is a high level of permanent interdependency.12 
 
A clear and simple definition, which should serve as a basis13 for my work, is offered 
by the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships: “A cooperative venture 
between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that 
best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of 
resources, risks and rewards.”14 
 
The term “traditional/conventional public sector procurement”, which I use in this 
work, is not confined to any specific “conventional” form of public-private cooperation. 
It also includes, and this is the reference of all the theoretical models described 
below, contracting-out of service provision after the infrastructure has being built.  
 
Characteristics of public-private Partnerships 
 
In this section I will deal with general characteristics of PPP-agreements, areas of 
application and with the different types of PPP-contracts. In the further analysis of 
public-private partnerships I’ll only differentiate according to the tasks which are 
undertaken by the private sector15 and will not confine myself to any area of 
application in particular. In the sections concerning task bundling, the examined 
object is a PPP-project where building stage and service provision stage are 
bundled. This corresponds to a BTO-, BOT-, and BOO- type of PPP. Later, when 
focusing on the private financing aspect of public-private partnerships, the underlying 
project type is DBFO or PFI, respectively.  
 
                                                 
12 Schaeffer and Loveridge, (2002), p. 181 
13 This definition is of course rather general, but consequently takes into account all the possible types of PPP-
contracts, illustrated below.  
14 http://www.pppcouncil.ca/aboutPPP_definition.asp 
15 See Table 2 
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We have seen that existing definitions of public-private partnerships are rather vague 
and so not describe them clearly. However, public-private partnerships have 
peculiarities that make them unique. 
 
The European Commission specified following characteristics of PPPs in its Green 
Paper on public-private partnerships and community law on public contracts and 
concessions:16 
 
o “The relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation between 
the public partner and the private partner on different aspects of a planned 
project.” 
o “The method of funding the project, in part from the private sector, sometimes 
by means of complex arrangements between the various players. 
Nonetheless, public funds - in some cases rather substantial - may be added 
to the private funds.” 
o “The important role of the economic operator, who participates at different 
stages in the project (design, completion, implementation, funding). The public 
partner concentrates primarily on defining the objectives to be attained in 
terms of public interest, quality of services provided and pricing policy, and it 
takes responsibility for monitoring compliance with these objectives.” 
o “The distribution of risks between the public partner and the private partner, to 
whom the risks generally borne by the public sector are transferred. However, 
a PPP does not necessarily mean that the private partner assumes all the 
risks, or even the major share of the risks linked to the project. The precise 
distribution of risk is determined case by case, according to the respective 
ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk.” 
 
According to Iossa and Martimort (2008), a public private partnership involves a 
greater risk and responsibility transfer to the private contractor than in traditional 
procurement. Since the government only specifies the basics of the service it want to 
be delivered, design, construction and operational risk are largely transferred to the 
private partner.17 
 
                                                 
16 See Green paper (2004), p. 3 
17 See Iossa and Martimort (2008), p. 4 
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Keith Faulkner mentioned three characteristics of a true partnership in the public-
private context:18 
 
1. they share risks rather than transferring them; 
2. boundaries between the parties become blurred rather than defining them 
too exactly; and 
3. they commit to mutual gain 
 
Grout (1997) states three main criteria that a project has to fulfill in order to belong to 
the category of public-finance initiatives. First, the project has to be fully or at least 
mainly financed by the private sector and the contract specifies details concerning 
service consumption and not the asset itself. Second, a significant part of the risk 
must be transferred to the private partner, and third, the project must be proven to 
bring value for money to the taxpayer.19 
 
Areas of application 
 
Fields of application of public-private partnerships we can find in most diverse 
territories of public acting. 
A compact overview of areas of application provides table 2: 
 
Table 2:20: Areas of application of public-private partnerships. 
transport Supply/disposal Public building construction 
streets, bridges, 
tunnels 
airports 
waterways, 
harbors 
public transit 
 
energy: generation, 
distribution 
water:   production, 
preparation, 
distribution, 
canalization 
garbage: collection, 
disposal, recycling  
 
administration:  
city halls, tax offices, 
ministries 
health care/ 
seniority: 
retirement homes, 
hospitals 
education: 
kindergartens, 
schools, colleges, 
universities  
security:                police 
buildings, prisons, 
barracks 
leisure/culture:     sports 
facilities, museums 
others:            exhibition 
grounds, business parks 
                                                 
18 See Faulkner (2004) 
19 See Grout (1997), pp. 54-55 
20 See Bundesverband deutscher Banken (2004), p. 16 
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Types of public-private Partnerships 
 
Basically there are 4 different types of public-private Partnerships, differenced by the 
legal nature of private-sector involvement in the project. 
 
Table 3:21 types of PPPs 
Contract Type Design-Build 
Finance-
Operate 
(DBFO)(1) 
Build-
Transfer-
Operate 
(BTO)(2) 
Build-Operate-
Transfer 
(BOT)(3) 
Build-Own-
Operate (BOO) 
Construction Private Private Private Private 
Operation Private Private Private Private 
Ownership* Public Private sector 
during 
construction, 
then public 
sector 
Private sector 
during Contract 
then public 
sector 
Private 
Who pays? Public sector or 
users 
Public sector or 
users 
Public sector or 
users 
Private-sector 
offtaker public 
sector, or users 
Who is paid? Private Private Private Private 
* in all cases, ownership may be in form of a joint-venture between the public and the private partner 
(1) Also known as Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF) or Design-Build-Finance-Maintain 
(DBFM). 
(2) Also known as Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL), Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer (BLOT) of Build-Lease 
Transfer (BLT). 
(3) Also known as Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT).  
 
 
The typical PPP contract is a DBFO type, where the private partner designs, builds, 
finances and operates the asset.22 These also called PFI arrangements usually 
involve three groups: A public sector agency, a consortium that is responsible for 
                                                 
21 See Yescombe (2007), p. 12 
22 See for example IMF or Bennet and Iossa (2005) 
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construction and service provision, and a bank or another financial institution that 
finances the project. Generally there is no link between the public agency and the 
financial institution.23 
 
Objectives and motivation of public-private Partnerships 
 
The participating parties dispose of diverging motivations and pursue different goals 
within the partnership. Naturally, public and private interests are partially difficult to 
synchronize.  
 
For the public administration 
 
Kooiman (1993) mentions public-private partnerships as one of three strategies for 
the municipality to deal with the constantly changing line of demarcation between 
itself and society: 
 
• Privatization/ socialization24 
• (de)regulation 
• public-private partnership 
 
Motivations for public-private partnerships are diverse among several countries.  
Particularly in industrialized countries there is a trend to less public and more private 
over the last decades. In North America and also among most of the European 
countries, we can observe a change of paradigms, proceeding with varying velocity.  
 
Table 4 shows an overview of changing paradigms concerning fulfillment of tasks by 
public administrations:25 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 See Grout (1997), p. 54 
24 Socialization is a less popular strategy. It neither coincides with changing paradigms mentioned below.  
25 See Spiegl (2002), p. 39 
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Table 4: Changing paradigms of public administration’s task fulfillment 
old paradigm  new paradigm 
state does everything itself ð state regulates through general conditions 
national solutions ð transnational, international solutions 
public funding ð public and private funding mixed 
Network and operation in one hand ð Separation of network and operation 
protected monopoly market ð competition through liberalization  
supply oriented marketing ð demand orientated marketing 
one-dimensional supplier-product-
structure  
ð networked suppler-product-structures 
 
 
Newly industrializing countries and developing countries focus less on modernization 
strategies. More important is the generation of essential infrastructure for economic 
development, especially in countries with surpassing population growth. 26 
There are significant infrastructure expenditure needs for example in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Nevertheless, due to the stringent budget constraints that many developing 
countries have faced lately, the majority of these countries cannot afford to allocate 
the necessary resources to infrastructure. 27 
 
According to the authors’ accordance, the lack of public funds28 is the most 
essential motivation for the government to provide public services under public-
private partnerships. However, the starting positions are very different. In 
industrialized countries the objective is to expand the existing high level 
infrastructure. Newly industrializing countries and developing countries, on the other 
hand, need to satisfy basic necessities of life and to provide a steady and secure 
economic situation. In the European Union, the pressure to reach the Maastricht 
criterions causes a wave of privatization and outsourcing of infrastructure facilities to 
other legal structures. Public-private partnerships help the public administration to 
                                                 
26 See Spiegl (2002), p 40 
27 See Hammami, Ruhasyankiko and Yehoue (1999), p. 3 
28 Vining and Boardman (2008) mention in this context: “the unwillingness or inability to create adequate capital 
financing mechanisms due to institutional barriers”. 
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evacuate projects from public budgets in order to guarantee compliance of the 
criterions.29 
 
Vining and Boardman (2008) judge the normative basis for “minimization of on-
budget government expenditures and/or the desire not to increase current debt 
levels”, as a reason for the public administration’s participation in PPPs, as weak. In 
the end the government or the users have to pay for construction and service of the 
project, independent of its form of financing. Using a PPP mainly changes the 
government’s schedule of payment, i.e. it can distribute its cost obligations over a 
longer period, but it’s probably not going to reduce its costs. Concerning durable 
infrastructure projects, which benefit more generational cohorts, time-shifting can be 
defended in the name of inter-generational efficiency.30 
 
Dewatripont and Legros (2005) even state this as “(ab)using public accounting rules 
that do not correctly capture government assets and liabilities”. Investigating this from 
the economical point of view is however not necessary as efficiency PPPs is not 
affected.31 
 
Another resource in short supply, apart from the public administration’s monetary 
capital, is specific competence possessed by the specialized private partner.  
Vining and Boardman (2008) describe a few reasons why, infrastructure and services 
can be provided more cost-efficiently, through a PPP.  
First, private entities are more specialized and experienced in construction and 
management of many businesses and, as a result of this, better economies of scale 
can be realized. Private-sector infrastructure entities can be global acting firms, while 
governments normally have less of the experience and expertise required by the 
project.  
The second reason for the private partner’s cost-efficiency is that the private partner 
has a stronger incentive to minimize costs. These incentives are likely to become 
most evident in for example a greater willingness to alter project specifications or to 
use new technologies in order to reduce costs.  
                                                 
29 See Spiegl (2002), p 41 
30 See Vining and Boardman (2008), p. 12 
31 See Dewatripont and Legros (2005), p. 132 
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Third, the private firm/consortium may have lower labor costs because it potentially 
hires non-union workforce.  
Fourth, monopoly public administrations are especially liable to X-inefficiency or 
technical inefficiency. 32 
 
Definition of X-Inefficiency: “While monopoly may provide the basis for extracting higher 
prices from customers, the lack of competitive stimulus may raise the costs of producing the 
goods and services it sells. The lack of incentives or competitive pressures may lead 
monopolistic firms to neglect minimizing unit costs of production, i.e., to tolerate "X-
inefficiency" (phrase coined by H. Leibenstein). Included in X- inefficiency are wasteful 
expenditures such as maintenance of excess capacity, luxurious executive benefits, political 
lobbying seeking protection and favourable regulations, and litigation”.33 
 
Collin (1998) also mentions the ”commercial mental disposition” of the private 
partner, helping to create a climate of cost pressure and market orientation. 
 
Many authors mention risk-reduction for the public sector as a further explanation 
for participation in a public-private partnership.  
The public partner does not longer bear the financial risk linked with dealing with 
construction costs, maintenance costs and usage levels (revenue).It is probable that 
the private partner has more expertise with complex financial instruments and better 
access to markets that provide a more efficient risk-allocation. Another important 
point is that the private sector does face less political risk than the public 
administration. However, because a PPP does not reduce the risk itself, but only 
transfers and spreads risk more broadly, Vining and Boardman (2008) describe this 
normative justification for involvement in a PPP as “not strong”. It has to be asked at 
what price the risk is transferred to the private sector.34 
 
Vining and Boardman (2008) further mention another reason for the public sectors to 
form a public-private partnership. Governments think that, when providing the service 
by a PPP, it is politically more realizable to introduce user-fees which cause 
lower government net expenditures. There is better acceptance from the users/voters 
                                                 
32 See Vining and Boardman (2008), p. 13 
33 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms:  http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3333 
34 See Vining and Boardman (2008), pp. 13-14 
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for the private sector’s need to create returns in order to cover costs, repay debts or 
make profit, than for the government to behave like this.35 
 
In summary, it can basically be said that through a public-private partnership, three 
problems should be solved: 
 
1. Renewal of public infrastructure in spite of lacking budget resources due to 
restrictive budget policy. 
2. Lack of efficiency in construction and operation in public infrastructure. Public 
authorities in many cases don’t possess special competences needed in order 
to efficiently realize larger projects.36 
3. risk reduction 
 
 
For the private partner 
 
Basically, the motivation for the private partner to take part in a public-private 
partnership can be assumed to be directly or indirectly connected to acquisition of 
profits. Profit seeking is the basic objective for every for-profit firm. The main motive 
for a private firm to get involved in a public-private partnership project is to make use 
of and to augment the existing capital as well as to seek profit and rents. Subsidies 
and fiscal benefits allow the PPP projects the attainment of additional returns. 37 
 
It is important to see that profit maximization is not a one-period phenomenon. The 
private firm wants to maximize its profits over the contract life and will try to find new 
profit sources as the contract unfolds. To prevent opportunistic behavior in that 
context, contracts have to be written tightly. 38 
 
One motivation, indirectly connected to profits, is the synergy appearing when the 
PPP allows a resource, which is produced by the PPP or supplied by the private 
partner, to be used more intensely. Another motivation is that involvement in a public-
                                                 
35 See Vining and Boardman (2008), p. 15 
36 Puwein (2004), p.?? 
37 See e.g. Budäus (1997) 
38 See Vining and Boardman (2008), p. 16 
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private partnership can create goodwill for the private partner. Through a PPP the 
private firm can reveal its high quality work and its reliability as a business associate. 
This can improve the private partner’s universal image, and reduces the municipal 
uncertainty about possible future contracts. 39 
 
 
 
Public-private partnerships from the perspective of 
economic theory 
 
 
Basically, much of the economic literature on public-private partnerships is based on 
the incomplete contracts approach, while other authors assume complete contracts 
under information asymmetries, to explain PPPs in another way.  
The most important characteristic of PPPs, which is considered by these two theory 
streams is the bundling of decision rights.  
The different stages of a PPP-project, financing, building and operation, are strongly 
connected. Building of the asset determines its quality, which then has a positive or 
negative effect on operating cost and maintenance .The builder has to be induced to 
internalize possible externalities in order to avoid inefficiencies. It has been showed 
that the builder has an incentive to do so if he is also in charge of operating and 
maintaining the infrastructure.  
The asymmetric information approach analyses how informational rents and 
incentives to make efficiency-enhancing efforts change if decision rights are 
unbundled. On the other hand, the other approach concentrates on the effects of 
contractual incompleteness on the efficient allocation of decision rights.40 
 
Apart from considerations concerning task bundling, current literature pays attention 
to the financial side of public-private partnerships. What are the economic 
consequences of private funding of PPP-projects? Also this question is answered by 
the two theoretical streams mentioned above.  
                                                 
39 See Collin (1998), p. 275 
40 See Dewatripont and Legros (2005), p. 124 
  16 
 
 
Information asymmetries and incomplete contracts are both parts of the so called 
contract theory. The theory of contracts has his origin basically in the objective to turn 
away from general equilibrium models, which were not able to explain the economy 
realistically enough. In the 1970s economists founded a new way to study economic 
relationships. “They focused on partial models that take into account the full 
complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined 
institutional settings.” 41 
 
Before explaining applications on public-private partnerships I will give an overview of 
the relevant economic theory, i.e. the relevant basic ideas. 
 
Theory of incomplete contracts 
 
The theory of incomplete contracts is mainly the continuation of transaction costs 
theory and formalizes its intuitions. Transaction cost economics, principally due to 
Coase and Williamson, assumes that agents are opportunistic but also limitedly 
rational.42 The modern theory of incomplete contracts originated in Grossman-Hart 
(1986) and Hart- Moore (1988). The foundations of the theory were much debated in 
the 1990s, when Maskine-Tirole (1999) published their “irrelevance theorem”.  
A simplified description of this theorem was made by Siemer (2004): “If parties can 
assign a probability distribution to their possible future payoffs, then the fact that they cannot 
describe the possible physical states (e.g., the possible characteristics of the good to be 
traded) in advance is irrelevant to welfare. That is, the parties can devise a contract that 
leaves them no worse off than were they able to describe the physical states ex ante.”43 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See Salanié (2005), p. 2 
42 See Salanie, p.194 
43 See Siemer (2004), p. 95, The original theorem can be found in Masine, Tirole (1999), p. 92. 
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Basic Idea of transaction costs theory  
 
Transaction cost theory dates from the following question: “Why don’t all the 
economic processes (transactions) take place in the market, but in enterprises 
(hierarchies)?” 
According to Coase and later to Williamson, transaction costs play the crucial role for 
the existence of hierarchies. Transaction costs result from the search of appropriated 
partners, from cost of negotiation and completion of a contract as well as from costs 
of controlling and enforcement of the contract, which is the centre stage of 
transaction costs theory. The decision if an economic transaction is made in the 
market or in a hierarchy depends on the amount of total costs (transaction cost + 
production costs).44 
 
Holdup Problem 
 
Many assets are relationship specific and have little value outside the relationship 
under study. The input of specific capital has a decisive meaning. Specific 
investments are made for particular transactions and are not or only partially 
applicable to others. Hence, the contractual partner who made a specific investment 
is dependent on the compliance of the contract. This dependence contains the risk of 
renegotiations which can lead to blackmailing (holdup) respectively to the loss of 
quasi-rents to the contractual partner who hasn’t made any or less specific 
investment. As a result the partners tend to underinvest.45  
The characteristics of the holdup problem can be made more formal by an 
archetypical model of the incomplete contracts literature.46 
 
Implications of transaction costs theory for public-private partnerships 
 
Many tasks of the public administration require specific capital. Thus the transaction 
costs theory is applicable to PPPs. At the beginning of the process there is an award 
                                                 
44 See Mühlenkamp (2006), pp. 33-34 
45 See e.g. Salanié (2005) p.195 or Mühlenkamp (2006), p. 34 
46 See Salanié (2005), p. 196 
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procedure in order to find the best potential seller. Afterwards we can find extensive, 
but also inevitably incomplete contracts to be negotiated, monitored and enforced. 
However, if the public administration chooses hierarchy as an alternative, that means 
it takes charge of the task itself, these costs don’t arise. But on the other hand there 
possibly emerge higher production costs due to legal regulations or policy objectives 
that restrict the radius of operation more than in the private sector.47 
 
Finally the total costs of cooperation with a private firm and a pure public solution 
(there are also intermediate forms) are compared. The more specific the needed 
capital is, the bigger is the hold-up risk and the expensive are cet.par. legal 
regulations and their monitoring and enforcement. When applying the transaction 
costs theory to PPP, one has to consider two peculiarities: 
 
1. The public administration wants to achieve other objectives than a private 
enterprise – instead of realization of profits, public interests; and 
2. the selection of the partner is liable to stricter regulations than in the private 
sector- award procedure. 
 
In theoretic models the objective of public interest is interpreted as welfare 
maximization, the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus. This implies, 
firstly, a conflict of interests between public administration and private partners. 
However, economic literature identifies this goal conflict as the driving force of 
operational efficiency at least in PPP undertakings.  
Secondly, the aim of welfare maximization potentially weakens negotiation position of 
the public administration compared to the private partner. Bös (2001a) and 
Bös/Lüfelsmann showed that efficient contracts48 are possible for the cases of 
unilateral and mutual specific investments, if the buyer behave welfare maximizing 
and non varying quality.  
                                                 
47 See Mühlenkamp (2006), p. 37-38 
48 A contract is efficient if:  
1. if it causes the optimal incentive to invest; and 
2. if it effects optimal tradeoff 
(Investment incentive is based on the expected incentive to invest.) 
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However, if quality is varying, which is more realistic, the re-negotiation position of 
the public administration worsens because of its welfare orientation. Then, efficient 
contracts are only possible under certain circumstances but not in general. 49 
 
Another peculiarity of the transaction costs theory concerning PPPs is the obligation 
of the public administration to a complex risky bidding procedure of the European 
Union: 
 
o This leads to especially high transaction costs in public tasks. 
o The supplier protection within the framework of EU- award regulations tends to 
result in waste of capital. Due to the possibility for a defeated bidder to 
controvert the award decision in the court of law, not only the winners of the 
tendering are betrayed into specific investment. Investment from losers of the 
tendering is wasted. 50 
 
Conclusions on PPP: 
 
Ø The bidding procedure alone implies high (ex ante) transaction costs  
Ø After placing the order, re-negotiations, legal disputes and consequently high 
ex post transaction costs are to be expected.  
Ø According to the logic of transaction costs theory (and also to the theory of 
property rights), the private enterprise has incentives to stronger conduct 
negotiations/re-negotiations than the public administration. This can be 
assumed because in a private firm the negotiation performance is reflected in 
company profit respectively in management salaries. By contrast, for 
representatives of a public administration there usually are no financial 
consequences thanks to better negotiation results. These incentive 
asymmetries alone create doubts of the general advantage of PPP’s for tax 
payers. 
Ø Also without considering the id asymmetric incentives, because of its welfare 
orientation the public administration would have an inferior negotiating position 
to the private enterprises. 51 
                                                 
49 See Mühlenkamp (2006), p. 39 
50 See Mühlenkamp (2006), p. 39 
51 See Mühlenkamp (2006), p. 40 
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The above-mentioned insights on public-private partnerships are rather intuitive. The 
continuation/formalization of the transaction cost theory is the theory of incomplete 
contracts, which is also applicable to the peculiarities of PPPs.  
 
Incomplete contracts  
 
In many economic relationships there are contingencies that may affect the 
contractual relationship, but are not taken into account in the contract. There are 
several reasons for a contract to be incomplete. First, at some point the cost of 
writing a specific clause to cover an unlikely contingency exceed the benefit. The 
second reason is the incapacity or unwillingness of courts and third parties, to verity 
ex post, the value of particular variables observed by contractants. Third, in some 
cases it is difficult, or even impossible to assign probability to relevant events and to 
stipulate the clauses of the contract on these events. From all these reasons follows 
that contracts typically include only a limited amount of variables, the most important 
ones or the ones which are easiest measurable. If there are unforeseen events, 
arising during the relationship, which have influence on the conditions of the 
relationship, and the contract includes no clue as to how the parties should respond, 
they will renegotiate the contract. In contrast to the implications of complete 
contracts, renegotiation can be socially useful and occur in equilibrium. 52 
 
 
The Buyer-Seller Model 
 
The seller S and the buyer B jointly operate a physical asset that produces a good to 
the seller at cost c that has value v for the buyer.  
Either party can make a specific investment with the following features. First, it 
increases the productivity of the relationship. Second, it has a lower value outside of 
this relationship than inside. Third it is costly to the party that makes it. The seller’s 
investment is reduces the cost for the seller (human capital investment). The buyer’s 
investment ib increases the value of the good. Thus, )( sicc =  is a decreasing convex 
                                                 
52 See Salanié (2005), p. 194 
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function and )( bivv =  is an increasing convex function. Assuming that 
)0()( ccovv =≥= , it is always efficient to produce and trade. The two parties are risk-
neutral and do not discount the future. If trade takes place at price p, their utilities are 
ss iicp −− )(  and piiv bb −−)( . 
If they can’t agree, what is going to happen depends on who owns the right to control 
the asset. If only one of them has the control right, he or she can use it to trade on a 
competitive market where the equilibrium price of the good is pc. Because the 
specific investment has no value on this market, the value of the good is v(0) and the 
costs are c(0). This implies that )0()0( vpc c ≤≤ . In the first-best outcome of this 
model the buyer and the seller always trade. The total surplus is ssbb iiciiv −−− )()( . 
Hence, their equilibrium investments is* and ib* are given by c’(is*)= -1 and v’(ib*)=1.53 
 
For a better understanding of incomplete contracts, I want to describe shortly the 
situation under a complete contract.  
 
The complete contract 
Under a complete contract there are no information asymmetries and no uncertainty. 
Under this conditions the contracts causes the first-best. Both parties choose the 
efficient investment level, and they accept the contract as by definition, 
**** )()( bbss iivvpciic −≤≤≤≤+  
It is not required to write the values of the specific investments in the contracts. 
Hence, they need not to be verified by a court. It is enough to fix the price in the 
contract in order to ensure that buyer and seller choose first-best investment levels. 
Under complete contracts, the allocation of property rights has no influence on 
efficiency. Assuming that the good initially belongs to the buyer (seller), it is likely that 
the price p will be closer to c  ( v ).54 Thus, the allocation of property rights changes 
the income streams and is of concern to the parties, but the efficiency of the fixed-
                                                 
53 See Salanié ( 2005), p. 196-197 
54 )0()0( ccvv =≥=  
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price contract does not depend on it. Salanié (2005) states this as “one of the biggest 
shortcomings in the theory of complete contracts”. The complete contracts theory has 
little to say about the efficient allocation of property rights. 55 
 
Incomplete contracts and property rights 
 
The theory of incomplete contracts connects the question of property rights to legal 
tradition. According to Roman law, property rights are a combination of usus (the 
right to use the good), fructus (the right to what it produces), and abusus (the right to 
sell or give away the good. Grossman-Hart (1986) claim that property rights should 
be seen as residual control rights. This means, that when an unforeseen contingency 
occurs, the owner of the asset has the right to decide how it should be used. The 
owner also has exclusive rights on all incomes that have not been shared ex ante by 
a contractual agreement. If contracts are complete, these rights, of course, are 
worthless, because, by definition, no unforeseen contingency can arise. Thus, 
property rights only matter if contracts are incomplete.  
It is assumed that the characteristics of the good, like the specific investments, 
cannot be verified by a court, whereas they can be observed by buyer and seller. 
Consequently, ex ante there can be no contract although ex post trade is always 
efficient. After the parties have observed the specific investments, when 
renegotiating, most literature assumes that they are going to share the increase in 
total surplus equally. The final price depends on possibilities of threat for both parties. 
Thus, the incentives to invest of buyer and seller and efficiency depend on the initial 
allocation of property rights. To show this, there are 3 cases to be distinguished:56 In 
the case of a PPP, the public administration naturally corresponds to the buyer which 
buys a service from the private firm/consortium. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 See Salanié (2005), p. 197 
56 See Salanié, p. 198 et seq 
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The seller owns the asset 
 
If the seller doesn’t agree on a price with the buyer, he can sell the good on the 
competitive market. In that case, the buyer has spent bi  in vain. If the parties 
renegotiate a price p, the seller obtains a utility gain )( cpp − , while the buyer gains 
))(( piv b − . 
At the Nash solution, the final price is: 
2
)( cb pivp
+
= . 
The buyer’s ex post utility is: b
c
b
bb i
piv
piiv −
−
=−−
2
)(
)( . 
The seller’s ex post utility is: ss
c
b
ss iic
piv
iicp −−
+
=−− )(
2
)(
)( . 
These formulas indicate that the seller has the incentive to choose the efficient 
investment level is*, while the buyer underinvests: 2)( =′ biv  
 
The buyer owns the asset 
 
If the buyer owns the asset, he can ask another seller to operate it for price pc, while 
the initial seller has made an investment of is in vain. Renegotiating increases the 
buyer’s utility by pp c −  and the seller’s utility by )( sicp − . It can be shown by simple 
calculations that the buyer invests at the efficient level and the seller underinvests: 
2)( −=′ sic  
 
Joint ownership 
 
Both parties need the accordance of the other to operate the asset. If the parties do 
not trade, both lose their investments. Trading they gain )( sicp −  and piv b −)( .  
The resulting equilibrium price is 
2
)()( sb icivp
−
=  and final utilities are  
b
sb i
iciv
−
−
2
)()(
 and s
sb i
iciv
−
−
2
)()(
. 
Under joint ownership, however, both parties underinvest, as 2)( =′ biv  and 
2)( −=′ sic . 
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Depending on the shape of c and v, in this simple model, both, a seller or buyer 
ownership can be optimal. Joint ownership is the worst case. The model implies that 
the owner always invests efficiently. Under incomplete contracts, property rights 
protect their holders against a holdup. Then the optimal allocation of property rights 
depends on the particular social costs of underinvestment made by the contractants.  
 
 
Asymmetric Information Problems 
 
Numerous Authors make use of the classic Principal-Agent approach, where 
contracts are in general counted as complete57, in order to explain the peculiarities of 
public-private partnerships. Contrary to this approach, we have seen the incomplete 
contracts approach where the information structure is assumed to be symmetric.58 
There are 3 types of asymmetric information problems: 
 
1. Moral hazard 
2. Adverse Selection 
3. Signalling 
 
The first two problems occur frequently in the public-private partnership’s literature, 
while Signalling isn’t mentioned to the same extend. Before expanding on the 
implementations on PPPs, I’m going to describe the basic moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. To be able to compare the cases of asymmetric information, a 
base model is needed. 
 
Symmetric information contracts 
 
First-best: 
All the relevant information is verifiable (both have the same information), and the 
principal’s problem is to design a contract that the agent will accept. The principal 
                                                 
57 From the legal point of view, the contract is complete since obligations are specified for all states of the world.  
58 See Martiensen (2000), pp. 361, 367 
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has to decide the effort e that he/she demands of the agent and the wages 
{ } niixw ,...,1)( = that the agent will earn according to the result. The set of possible results 
is finite, and the probability of result ix  depends on effort e: [ ] )(Pr epexx ii == , for 
{ }ni ,...,2,1∈ . The principal will try to determine the cheapest contract that the agent is 
going to accept, given a certain effort level. The principal has to offer the agent a 
utility level, which is greater or equal the utility level that the agent would obtains from 
a outside relationship.59 
 
Solving the following problem, leads to the (pareto) efficient solution: 
 
    { }[ ]niixwe
Max
,...,1)(, =
    ))(()(
1
ii
n
i
i xwxBep −∑
=
 
 
s.t. ∑
=
≥−
n
i
ii Uevxwuep
1
)())(()(  agent’s participation condition 
 
Where )()(),( evwuewU −=  is the agent’s utility function and the principal’s behavior 
depends on the function )( wxB − . B is assumed to be concave increasing: 0>′B , 
0≤′′B . The concavity of B suggests that the principal is either risk-neutral or risk-
averse. The marginal disutility of effort is not decreasing: 0)( >′ wu , 0)( ≤′′ wu , 
0)( >′ ev , 0)( ≥′′ ev . 
The principal is not directly interested in the agent’s effort, but in the result of the 
task.  
 
According to the solution of the id maximization problem, the optimal contract has 
the following characteristics: 
 
The optimal distribution of risk implies that the ratio of the marginal utilities of the 
principal and the agent should be constant, independent from the result: 
 
                                                 
59 See Lafont and Martimort (2002), p. 34 
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))(*(
))(*('
i
ii
xwu
xwxB
′
−
=constant60 efficiency condition 
 
Depending on the objective functions of both parties, there are several implications of 
the efficiency condition: 
 
If the principal is risk-neutral, =′B constant, then the efficiency condition requires that 
=′ ))(*( ixwu constant for all i. If the agent is risk-avers, then ))(*())(*( ji xwuxwu ′=′  
and thus )(*)(* ji xwxw = . Consequently, at the optimal contract, the agent’s payoff 
is independent of the result. If the principal is risk-neutral, he accepts all the risk in 
the optimum. The agent receives the same payoff in all eventualities and w* depends 
only on the effort demanded.  
 
If the agent is risk-neutral, =′u constant, and the principal is risk-averse, 
=′′B constant, then there appears the opposite scenario. The efficiency condition 
requires that =−′ ))(*( ii xwxB constant for all i. Hence 
)(*...)(*)(* 2211 nn xwxxwxxwx −==−=− . Now, the principal’s profit is independent 
of the result and the agent bears the full risk, insuring the principal against variations 
in the result. This can be interpreted as a franchise contract. 
 
If both parties are risk-averse, each one will have to bear a part of the risk, 
depending on their degrees of risk-aversion. From the Kuhn-Tucker first order 
condition of the id maximization problem, it can be derived that 
 
0
**
1 =
′
′′
+





−
′
′′
−
ii dx
dw
u
u
dx
dw
B
B
 
 
 
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001) denote the principal’s measure of absolute 
risk-aversion by 
B
B
rp ′
′′
−= , and by 
u
u
ra
′
′′
−=  the agent’s measure of absolute risk-
aversion. Thus, the above equation can be written as: 
                                                 
60 See Macho-Stadler (2001), p. 21-22 for formal proof.  
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ap
p
i rr
r
dx
dw
+
=
*
 
 
This equation pictures how the agent’s wage changes given an improvement in the 
result. The more risk-averse is the agent (i.e. the greater ar ), the less the wage is 
influenced by the result. The optimal contracts can be of a complex shape. A simple 
contract format is the set of linear contracts: ii bxcxw +=)(* .  
The linear contract is only optimal when b
dx
dw
i
=
*
. Though, this condition is satisfied 
in very few occasions since it requires that the participants have constant risk-
aversion. Even when information is symmetric, optimal contracts are only infrequently 
based on linear payments.61  
 
In the case of complete information, delegation does not entail any costs for the 
principal. He/she receives the same utility as if he/she carried out the project 
him/herself.62 
 
Moral hazard 
 
Second-best: 
“A moral hazard problem exists when the agent’s action is not verifiable, or when the 
agent receives private information after the relationship has been initiated.”63 
 
Moral hazard64 would not be a problem if agent and principal had identical objective 
functions. The conflict over which action should be taken out is the source of the 
arising agency costs. 65 
 
There are two possible forms of the moral hazard problem: 
 
                                                 
61 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001),pp.17-27 
62 Seee Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 34 
63 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 9 
64 As well as adverse selection 
65 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p.146 
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1.: The parties possess the same information when the relationship is established. 
The informational asymmetry is due to the fact that once the contract has been 
signed, the principal cannot observe/verify the action/effort of the agent, or at least, 
the principal cannot perfectly control the action. In order to model this situation it is 
assumed that the agent’s effort, made after signing the contract, is not verifiable, and 
thus this variable cannot be explicitly included in terms of the contract. 
Consequently, the agent’s payoff cannot depend on the effort he offers, or that he 
has been contracted to offer. The corresponding timeline is showed in Illustration 1.  
 
Ill. 166: The standard moral hazard problem. 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > 
P designs the 
contract 
 A accepts (or 
rejects) 
A supplies non-
verifiable effort  
N determines the 
state of the world 
Outcome and 
payoffs 
 
The most famous example for this kind of moral hazard problem is a simple labor 
contract where the effort of the employee (agent) is not verifiable.  
 
If the agent is risk-neutral, there is no effect on trade efficiency resulting from non-
observability of efforts. The principal can obtain the first-best outcome by offering a 
contract that is contingent on the production level. The contract includes incentives 
for good production and penalizations in the case of bad production. The risk-neutral 
agent is willing to accept this contract if his ex ante participation constraint is satisfied 
by the expected payment. It is possible to induce the optimal effort level without 
violating the agent’s participation constraint.67 
 
If we now consider, for example, the case of a risk-neutral principal and a risk-
adverse agent68, the solution will obviously differ from the optimal contract under 
symmetric information. A constant wage in this case provides full insurance but does 
not motivate the agent to exert any effort. In order to do this the principal must make 
the agent bear some risk. Thus the agent has to obtain a risk premium from the 
                                                 
66 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 9 
67 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 147 
68 This is also the case that is mostly assumed concerning a relationship between the public administration 
(principal) and a private partner (agent) in a PPP-relationship. See page 51 and following for a further 
discussion.  
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principal. There is a conflict between the participation and the incentive constraint 
that leads to an “insurance-efficiency trade-off”.69 
 
In this second-best world, the agent’s effort is not observable, and once he has 
signed the contract, he will make the lowest possible effort (emin). The principal will 
now obtain a lower expected profit than in the symmetric information situation 
because the agent’s effort is lower than the efficient level. The principal will anticipate 
this behavior, and thus if he/she offers a contract based on a fixed payoff, he/she will 
choose the wage (wmin) that exactly compensates the agent for the effort he uses. 
 
Formally, the problem can be written like this: 
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The notation “argmax” denotes the arguments that maximize the objective function 
that follow.70  
Solving the id program is difficult and not necessary for my purpose.71  
 
An easier way to obtain many of the conclusions of more general models it to study 
the problem, where the agent can only choose between two possible effort levels, 
high (H) and low (L). { }LH eee ,∈  
It is also assumed that the disutility for the agent is greater when he/she supplies 
high effort than when he makes lower effort: )()( LH evev >  
 
                                                 
69 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 148 
70 Holstroem (1979), p.76 
71 Holstroem (1979) mentiones two approaches that can be used so solve the program. See e.g. Spence and 
Zeckenhauser (1971) for one approach and e.g. Mirrlees (1974) for the other.  
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For all results nxxx <<< ...21 , from worst to best, the probabilities, )(
L
i
L
i epp =  and 
)( Hi
H
i epp = , that the result will be ix  when the agent offers low (high) effort, are 
greater than zero.  
 
The Principal prefers high effort to low, since good results are more likely when the 
agents works hard than when he is lazy. 
 
 
Hp  first order stochastically dominates Lp : 
∑∑
==
<
k
i
L
i
k
i
H
i Pp
11
, for all 1,...,1 −= nk  
 
This expresses that productivity is greater given high effort than given low effort. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral. The case 
where the agent is risk-neutral is easy to solve and not very insightful since the 
solution (a franchise contract) is the same as in the symmetric information case.  
 
Thus, the focus is only on a relationship involving a risk-averse agent.  
 
If the principal demands Le , no moral hazard problem exists. In this case the 
principal pays a fixed amount to the agent (as under symmetric information) and the 
agent makes low effort. If the principal pays a fixed amount, he cant prevail on the 
agent to make more effort than Le . 
However, if the principal demands high effort He , which means that the good results 
are very attractive, he/she needs to find a contract under which the agent’s payoff 
depends on his/her effort. The corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is 
written as follows: 
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)())(()())((  incentive compatibility constraint 
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The agent will make the effort He if the expected utility gain associated with this effort 
is greater than the implied increase in cost. The principal has to solve the same 
program as above, but with the new incentive compatibility constraint.  
 
Solving the id problem, some conclusions can be made on the optimal contract 
situation under a moral hazard problem: 
 
Unsurprisingly, the principal’s profit is strictly lower under information asymmetries 
than when he/she faces symmetric information.  
 
The wage will be greater the smaller the ratio Hi
L
i pp  is. 
 
If a risk-neutral principal pays the agent according to the result, it is only to give him 
incentives to make higher effort. In order to do this, he writes the contract on the only 
verifiable variable, the result ix . It is important to understand that the wage should 
not depend at all on the value that the principal places on the result. The reason is 
that this valuation is independent of the effort made and thus doesn’t serve as an 
incentive for the agent to work harder. On the other side, the result, of course, 
provides information about the agent’s behavior. The payoffs are related to this 
information and will increase in the result as long as a greater result is associated 
with greater effort. The objective of the contract is not the optimal risk-sharing 
arrangement, but that of giving incentives to the agent. 72 
 
 
2. Some moral hazard problems are attributable to informational asymmetries arising 
when, before executing the contracted effort, the agent observes the result of 
Nature’s decision but the principal doesn’t. When the contract is signed the 
uncertainty is equal for both, but before undertaking the contracted action, the agent 
will have and informational advantage by observing a relevant variable. (See Ill. 2) 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), pp.37-51 
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Illustration 273: Moral hazard with hidden information. 
 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > 
P designs the 
contract 
A accepts (or 
rejects) 
N chooses the 
state of the world 
which is only 
observed by A 
A makes effort Outcome and 
payoffs 
 
To this form of moral hazard problem, the literature has paid less attention, but it is 
still interesting to resume it briefly. An example for this kind of problem can be the 
relationship between an investor (individual) and a financial intermediary who has 
information about the current stock-market conditions that the individual doesn’t 
possess.  
 
After signing the contract, the agent observes if the conditions are favorable or 
unfavorable, Gθ  or Bθ . In the second case the agent may regret having signed it, as 
he/she normally will get less utility under unfavorable conditions.  
 
There are two types of models. One includes an ex ante participation constraint 
(given the expected utility at the moment when the contract is signed), where the 
agent cannot break off the contract after having signed. The other model type 
includes ex post participation constraints, so that the agent gets an expected utility 
which is never less than his reservation utility.  
 
If the principal offers a fixed wage, whenever the agent observes the good state of 
the world Gθ , he/she will be interested in making an effort less than the optimum, 
and then telling the principal that the market conditions were Bθ . Under the optimal 
contract in this case, when the agent learns that the conditions are good, the contract 
will lead him to make an effort Ge , where Gw  is the corresponding wage. A distortion 
is introduced with respect to the effort demanded when the market is unfavorable. 
The objective of this is to make the contract less attractive to the agent when the 
market situation is good.  
                                                 
73  See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p. 10 
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When the participation constraint is to be satisfied ex ante, on average, the agent’s 
utility will be equal to the reservation level. In the case of an ex post participation 
constraint, the agent will get his reservation utility U  when the market situation is 
bad. However, if the market conditions are good, then his utility will be greater than 
U . These results are already close to those under adverse selection models, 
mentioned in the next chapter. 74 
 
 
Adverse Selection 
 
An adverse Selection problem occurs when the agent holds private information 
before the relationship is begun. The principal can verify the agent’s behavior, but the 
optimal decision, the cost of this decision depends on the agent’s type which is 
private information to the agent. The principal knows that the agent can be one of 
several possible types but he/she cannot identify it.  
 
In contrast to the moral hazard problem where the uncertainty is exogenous, in this 
case the uncertainty is exogenous to the principal.75 
 
Illustration 376: Adverse Selection Problem 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > 
N chooses the 
type of A which 
is only observed 
by A 
P designs the 
contract 
A accepts (or 
rejects) 
A supplies effort N chooses the 
sate of the world 
outcome and 
payoffs 
 
An example for a situation where the principal does not have all the relevant 
information about the agent would be that of a person who hires a carpenter for 
home renovations. In this case the actual task may be well defined, but e.g. the 
worker’s ability, cleanness, and attitude are not.  
 
                                                 
74 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), pp.51-57 
75 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 146 
76 See Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001), p.11 
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The adverse selection problem does not only exist when the agent’s informal 
advances concerns his own personal characteristics, but also when there is 
asymmetric information relating to any variable relevant to the contractual 
relationship. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001) mention in that context the 
example of a firm negotiating a license agreement for the acquisition of a technology. 
Another example could be that of a public agency contracting a private firm for 
construction of a hospital without having information about the latest technology 
innovations, concerning hospital building.  
 
In their Model, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2001) consider a risk-neutral 
principal who contracts a risk-neutral or risk-averse agent to undertake some action 
on his/her behalf. Making an effort e is associated with an expected payment to the 
principal of ).(e∏ The agent’s effort is assumed to be verifiable. The objective 
function is concave, thus is assumed that 0)( >∏′ e and 0)( <∏ ′′ e .  
 
The agent can be of two different types, which is not distinguishable by the principal. 
The two agent types differ only concerning their effort disutility function, which is 
)(ev for type 1, and )(eKv , with 1>k  for type 2. Thus the disutility for any particular 
effort level is lower for type 1. The first type is now termed the “good” type (G) and 
the second is the “bad” type (B).  
 
The agent’s utilities are )()(),( evwuewU G −=  and )()(),( ekvwuewU B −= . 
 
If there was no adverse selection problem, there would be two different optimal 
contracts according to the agent’s type. In the optimum the principal would demand 
more effort from the good agents (to whom effort is less costly): ** BG ee > . 
Under symmetric information, the wage amount the two agent types will receive 
depends on the particular problem.77 
 
The optimal contract under asymmetric information describes a trade-off between 
rent extraction and efficiency:78 
                                                 
77 On the one hand for a given effort level, B requires a greater wage than G in order to participate. However, on 
the other hand, the principal demands less effort from B than from G, and thus the latter should receive a greater 
wage, at equal effort costs.  
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If under asymmetric information, the principal offered these two id contracts to any 
agent, allowing him to freely select the contract that he most likes, then a bad agent 
will choose the contract that is designed for him, but the good agent also prefers 
)*,( *BB we to ),( ** GG we : 
 
UekvwuevwuewU BBBBBBG +−>−+ )()()()(),( ****** . 
 
Under asymmetric information the principal can not identify the agent’s type. 
Therefore the principal considers that the probability of an agent being type G is q, 
where 10 << q .  
 
The principal can design a menu of contracts { }),(),,( BBGG wewe , where ),( ** GG we  is 
directed designed for the most efficient type agent, while ),( ** BB we  is catered to the 
least efficient type. By separating the two contracts, the principal can generally obtain 
greater expected profits than if only one contract was provided. In order to make 
either type select his/her adequate contract, the scheme must be self-selective. The 
menu of contracts must cause that each agent receives greater utility by truthfully 
revealing his type than by deluding the principal.  
 
The principal, thus, maximizes his/her expected profits subject to the restrictions that, 
the agent decides to sign that contract designed for his particular type: 
[ ]),(),,( BBGG wewe
Max
    [ ] [ ]BBGG weqweq −∏−+−∏ )()1()(  
 
s.t. Uevwu GG ≥− )()(  participation constraint (good agent) 
 Uekvwu BB ≥− )()(  participation constraint (bad agent) 
 )()()()( BBGG evwuevwu −≥−  incentive compatibility constraint79 (good agent) 
 )()()()( GGBB ekvwuekvwu −≥−  incentive compatibility constraint (bad agent) 
                                                                                                                                                        
78 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 41 
79 A menu of contracts { }),(),,( BBGG wewe is incentive compatible when ),( ** GG we  is weakly preferred to 
),( ** BB we  by the type-G agent and ),( ** BB we  is weakly preferred to ),( ** GG we  by the type-B agent. (See 
Laffot and Martimort (2002), p. 37) 
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The first participation constraint is implied by the second and the third equation. Thus 
it is possible to exclude the first constraint, which is an important feature of the 
adverse selection problem. The principal just needs to take into account the 
participation constraint to the least efficient agent.  
 
After solving the id problem, we can observe the following characteristics of the 
optimal contract menu { }),(),,( BBGG wewe : 
 
• The characteristic feature of adverse selection contracts is that the most 
efficient agent receives greater utility than his reservation level due to his 
private information- the high-efficient agent’s participation constraint is always 
strictly satisfied. This is due to the fact that if a menu of contracts makes it 
possible for the low-efficient agent to reach his reservation utility, it will also be 
possible for a high-efficient agent that faces lower production costs. Thus only 
the efficient type gets a positive information rent.80 
• The incentive condition for the best agents binds in the solution, while that 
corresponding to low-efficient agents doesn’t.  
• The efficiency condition binds for the good agent. The only efficient contract is 
that designed for the agent with the best characteristics.  
• A downward output distortion for the type-B agents is introduced. This is to 
make the contract ),( ** BB we  less attractive to type-G agents. The effects of a 
distortion are that the principal looses efficiency regarding type-B agents, but 
pays less informational rent to the type-G agents. This trade-off is favorable to 
the distortion.  
 
 
Incomplete contracts theory and public-private partnerships 
 
One of the most important features of public private partnership is the long contract 
period (including the building and operating-phase), attributable to the long life cycle 
of infrastructure facilities. As explained above, in order to reduce transaction costs 
                                                 
80 See Laffont and Martimort (2002), p. 42-43 
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the partners involved in a PPP try to design contracts that prevent them from hold-
ups. However, it is not possible to anticipate every incident and development that will 
affect the partnership over the contract period and even if all contingencies would be 
predictable, it will presumably be too complicated to include all that in the contract. 
Thus, the public-private partnerships contracts are incomplete. Renegotiations of 
PPP-contracts, that may arise, generate inefficiencies and make residual rights 
significantly relevant. 81 
 
The basis of recent articles on public-private partnerships, using an incompletes 
contract approach, is the classic literature on privatization and contracting out of 
public services. An important paper, written by Schmidt (1996), developed a model of 
privatization dealing with different allocations of ownership rights that affect allocative 
and productive efficiency. Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) formulated a Model to 
explain when a government should provide a service itself and when it should 
contract it out. Their Model concentrates on the provision of prisons, but is also 
applicable to provision of other goods or service. An insightful adaptation of this 
model in order to explain the costs and benefits of public-private partnerships 
provides Hart (2002). A recent work by Iossa and Martimort (2008) provides a further 
model.  
 
De Bettignies and Ross (2006) deal with the question of when private financing of 
public projects is optimal.  
 
See Table 5 for an overview of the models discusses in my work. 
 
                                                 
81 See Grout (1997), p. 64 and de Bettignies and Ross (2004), p. 140 
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Table 5: Incomplete Contracts models of PPPs 
Model Features and Assumptions 
Hart, Shleifer, Vishny 
(1997) 
• belongs to classic make-or-buy literature – deals with 
contracting-out 
• used as foundation for model of Hart (2002), discussing 
PPPs 
• assumed that cost and quality innovations can be introduced 
without breaking the initial contract 
• difference to standard property rights model: 
only one party invests, but can make two kinds of investment 
contracts define the extent to which quality can vary 
Task Bundling When is bundling of building and operation optimal? 
Hart (2002) 
• choice between public and private ownership is ignored 
• contract is incomplete in both cases – public provision and 
PPP 
• builder can make productive (reduces total costs, increases 
quality) and unproductive investment (reduces total cost and 
quality) 
• Difference to basis model of incomplete contracts: 
takes length of contract as given, world ends at date 2à 
doesn’t matter who owns asset at the end of the contract 
 
Iossa and Martimort 
(2008) 
• PPP is characterized by bundling, private ownership during 
the contract period, and ownership transfer to the 
government when contract period ends 
• residual value of the asset cannot be specified ex ante, but is 
observable ex post  
• discusses bundling and unbundling in two different cases - 
public and private ownership 
Financing When is either public or private financing preferable? 
Model Features and Assumptions 
de Bettignies and Ross 
(2006) 
• objective: determination of the optimal contract between 
developer and investor 
• two cases: public and private development – 2 equilibriums 
• project duration is assumed to be 2 periods, project can be 
terminated after period 1 
• payoffs are not known ex ante and depend on whether the 
project-management has been “good” or “bad” 
• main assumption: either party has the same probabilities of 
being a good or bad manager 
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Incomplete contracts and task bundling 
 
 
Let’s begin with a more precise description of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
Their Model wants to explain why private contracting is generally cheaper and why in 
some cases the quality of the service provided by the private contractor is lower, and 
in other cases higher than under government provision. This model does not deal 
directly with public-private partnerships, but is insightful as contracting out is the 
origin of PPPs.  
Within the model, the government agency chooses between contracting out and in-
house provision. The provider of the service, the government employee or a private 
contractor, can invest his/her time in quality improvement or in cost reduction efforts. 
Cost reduction has an adverse effect on quality and neither innovation can be 
included in the contract ex ante. 
 
The adverse effect on quality is modeled like this: 
 
)()( iebBB o β+−=  
)(ecCC o −=  
 
B stands for benefit, C for costs; e and i denote effort corresponding to cost 
innovation and quality innovation; 0)( ≥ec  is the reduction in cost corresponding to 
the cost innovation: 0)( ≥eb  is the reduction in quality due to cost innovation; and 
0)( ≥iβ  describes the quality increase less cost from the quality innovation.  
 
The key role in this model is played by the function )(eb , which measures how much 
quality falls caused by a cost cut. 
 
They make the important assumption that cost and quality innovations can be 
introduced without breaking the initial contracts because it is sufficiently incomplete. 
Further, they assume that the government and the Manager (private or government 
employee) are at least partly locked into each other once their relationship is in 
motion.  
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Both types of innovation need the allowance of the owner of the asset – the one who 
owns the residual control rights - to be carried out.  
 
If the provider is a government employee, she/he needs the approval from the 
government for either improvement. Consequently, the government employee 
receives only a fraction of the returns of the particular improvement. Furthermore, 
because the government employee is replaceable, the ways of effective 
compensation for either improvement are limited.  
 
On the other hand, if the provider is a private contractor, he/she doesn’t need the 
government’s approval for a cost reduction. However, for quality improvements if he 
wants to get a higher price. 
 
Thus, the private contractor has basically stronger incentives to improve quality and 
to reduce costs than the government employee. Though, the private’s incentive to 
reduce costs is too strong as he ignores the adverse impact on quality.  
 
After analyzing the model, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) set up some propositions 
about the efficiency of the different ways of service provision. Their arguments 
basically suggest: In-house provision is more advisable when non-contractible cost 
reductions have larger deleterious effects on quality, when quality innovations are 
unimportant, and when corruption in government procurement is a severe problem.  
In contrast, when quality reducing cost reductions can be controlled through a 
contract or competition, when quality innovations are important, and when patronage 
and powerful unions are a severe problem inside the government, privatization 
should be preferred.  
 
According to Hart (2002), the model of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ignores 
investment on the government side but supposes that the prison manager can make 
two kinds of investment. He points out that a government employee has little 
incentive to make either investment because it is easy for the government, which is 
the owner, to hold up the employee. The model of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
differs from the standard property rights model of the firm in two ways. First, only one 
party invests, but makes two kinds of investments. Second, the contract between the 
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government and the prison provider defines the extent to which quality can vary and 
thus plays an essential role. In the standard property rights model, long-term 
contracts are assumed to be sufficiently incomplete and thus useless.  
 
The model of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) deals with the question of when 
contracting out and when in-house provision is optimal, but doesn’t refer to public-
private partnerships.  
 
Contracting-out is the fundament for PPP but there are some crucial differences 
between these two forms of public-private cooperation:82 
 
1. the large number of tasks that are assigned to the same private partner 
(task bundling), and 
2. the privatization of project funding. 
 
 
Hart (2002) designed a model in terms of public-private partnerships. To explain the 
costs and benefits of public-private partnerships, he uses a model from the type of 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The choice between public and private ownership is 
ignored for convenience, and all provision is assumed to be private. He takes into 
account that under a PPP, construction and service provision are bundled. In case of 
a prison, the builder builds and runs the prison, more precisely, he may also 
subcontract with another firm to run it. Under conventional provision, however, the 
government enters into a contract with the builder that builds the facility and 
afterwards with another private party to run it. Under conventional provision, the 
government specifies the basic characteristics of the facility, required after the build 
stage, while under a public-private partnership it stipulates the basic service that 
should be provided in the operation stage. 
 In both cases the contract is incomplete, allowing variations of the facility and the 
service, without breaking the contract. In that model, the builder can make two 
different investments, i and e, while i is a productive investment83 that makes the 
                                                 
82 See de Bettignies and Ross (2006) 
83 As examples for i, he mentions a higher quality, more pleasant or airier building.  
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prison more attractive and easier to run and e is an unproductive investment84 that 
reduces total costs and quality.  
Concerning the example of a bridge, e can be using a new technology that reduces 
the stress on the beams, which lowers the repair-frequency and hence leads to less 
traffic interruptions; i can be a design with fewer traffic lanes, which reduces cost of 
cleaning, painting and maintenance, but leads to higher traffic congestion.85  
 
The builder faces a total investment cost of ei + . 
 
The unverifiable benefit of the society, measured in money, is described like this: 
)()( ebiBB o −+= β , and the cost from running the prison is  
)()?( eciCC o −−= . 
 
Thus, the investment i raises B and reduce C, while investment e reduces B and C.  
 
In the first-best situation, the net benefit, eiCB −−− , is maximized by selecting the 
adequate amounts of i and e: 
 
eieciCebiB −−++−−+ )()?()()( 00 β  
 
The first order conditions are: 
 
1*)(?*)( =′+′ iiβ  
1*)(*)( ≤′−′ ebec  with equality if 0* >e  
 
It is assumed that 1)0()0( ≤′−′ bc , which means that e is socially unproductive. 
 
If 0* =e  there is a corner solution in the first-best. All other first order conditions are 
assumed to have interior solutions.86 
 
                                                 
84 An unproductive investment can be that in the building process of the prison, the builder might recognize that 
installing an electric fence reduces the likelihood of escapes. That would reduce operating costs because fewer 
guards had to be hired, but probably it would not be desired by the government since it reduces quality.  
85 See Dewatripont and Legros (2005)., p. 126 
86 See Hart (2002), p. 6 
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In the second-best, the builder’s investments are non-verifiable, so they cannot be 
included in the contact. However, it is assumed that the provider of the prison 
services notices i and e. There are two different cases to be compared. 
 
1.: Separate contracts – unbundling: 
 
In this case the prison is built by one firm and then another firm is contracted for 
service provision. 
Imagine that the government contracts with a builder to build a prison, with specified 
basic characteristics, for a fixed price. When the facility is built, the government offers 
a contract for service provision to the lowest-bidding private entity. If there is 
competition among the bidders, the government will pay a price equal to the 
operating cost for the provision of the prison. Unsurprisingly, in this case the builder 
builds the cheapest prison possible, without breaking the contract. Although either 
investment affects the operating contract price the government has to pay later, the 
builder doesn’t pay attention to this. 0== ei  
 
2.:PPP – bundling: 
 
This case corresponds to service provision through a public-private partnership, 
where one private firm/consortium builds and operates the asset.  
The government specifies the basic quality of the service to be provided between 
dates 1 and 2 at a price P  and offers this contract before the facility is built. In this 
case the builder internalizes the cost of service provision, because he either provides 
the service him/herself or subcontracts the service.  
 
At date 0 the builder selects i and e to solve the following problem: 
 
Max eieciCPeiCP o −−++−=−−− )()?(  
 
s.t.  1(.)? =′  
1(.) =′c  
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In summary, under unbundling the productive investment, i, is too low, but the 
unproductive investment, e, has the right amount. In contrast, under bundling, the 
builder does still too little, but more, of the productive investment, but also more of 
the unproductive investment.  
 
Hart(2002)’s simple conclusion is that unbundling is good if the quality of the building 
can be well specified, but the service quality cannot be. In that case, 
underinvestment in i under conventional provision isn’t a serious problem, while 
overinvestment in e under PPP may be.  
Grout (1997) states that one of the biggest problems of the PPP model is that service 
specification in advance may not always be optimal. It may be difficult to anticipate 
e.g. reasonable quality standards for the following 20-30 years, which are determined 
by e.g. technological progress.87 
 
On the other hand, according to Hart (2002),  PPP is good if the service quality can 
be well specified in the initial contract, or, more generally if there are good 
performance measures which can be used to reward or penalize the service provider, 
whereas the quality of the facility can’t be. Under these circumstances, 
underinvesting in i under unbundling may be a serious problem, but overinvestment 
in e under PPP isn’t.  
 
Hart guesses that prisons and schools fall into the first category since contracting on 
the building is rather simple, while contracting on the service isn’t. Hospitals may fall 
into the second category, although specifying service quality may not be easy. 
However, it may be easier to find some reasonable performance measures 
concerning how patients are treated than to specify the hospital’s building quality.  
 
Hart (2002) states that his conclusions are at odds with much current thinking of 
policy makers because they frequently argue that PPPs are good because the 
private sector is a cheaper source for financing or insurance than the public sector. 
The current paper may shift attention from financing issues to what seems to be the 
central issue: (relative) contracting costs.  
 
                                                 
87 See Grout (1997), p. 64 
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The important difference of Hart’s model, in comparison with the basis model of the 
incomplete contracts theory, is that he takes the length of contract as given. It is 
implicitly assumed that the world ends at date 2. As a result, it doesn’t matter who 
owns the asset at the end of the contract.88 The Model can also be applied outside 
the public-private context. 
 
Iossa and Martimort (2008) take both, the “agency route” and the “ownership route” 
to explain the applicability of public-private partnerships. The results of their model of 
“pure agency considerations” are described below. Considering only this agency 
theory they arrive at the result that “PPPs should always be weakly preferred.” In 
order to find circumstances under which unbundling may be optimal they define PPP 
as an organizational form, which is characterized by bundling of design and 
operation, but also by private ownership of the asset over the length of the contract.89 
 
Ownership matters as far as the asset has some residual value for the owner at the 
end of the contract. To benefit from this, the residual market value provides 
incentives to invest in asset quality. Thus, ownership can be seen as a substitute for 
more complete contracts. This residual value depends on the specificity of the asset. 
Facilities that provide public services can be of two different categories:  
 
1. generic facilities as for example leisure centers, office accommodation and IT 
systems 
2. specific facilities such as schools, prisons and hospitals 
 
The less specific is the asset, the more demand exists from other users than the 
government, and the less differ the public and private residual value of the asset. The 
residual value is not contractible ex ante, but can be observed ex post.  
 
Formally, the value of the asset at the end of the contract, when the government 
uses this facility for public service provision, is denoted as sa , with 0>s and 
a denoting quality enhancing effort. The corresponding value for private use is saα , 
with 1<α . α  describes the degree of asset specificity, with a higher α  
                                                 
88 By ignoring ownership-considerations, he may be running the risk of overlooking important incentive issues.  
89 This corresponds to the characteristics of a BOT-contract. (See Table 3) 
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corresponding with less asset specificity. It is always optimal that the government 
owns the facility at the end of the contract since 1<α .  
Ownership transfer to the government when the contract period ends, is one of the 
main characteristics that differentiates PPPs from privatization.  
 
 
1. The model shows that public ownership has no influence on incentives. The 
reason is that the government owns the asset throughout the contract (there is 
no sale of the asset after the contract expires) and the quality enhancing effort 
is not contractible. Thus it is not possible to give any incentives to the firm, and 
whether bundling or unbundling is chosen, efforts and welfare do not change.  
 
2. In the case of private ownership, at the end of the contract, efficiency 
requires to transfer ownership to the government. Ex post, the price *p at 
which the ownership is transferred is a result of Nash bargaining with equal 
bargaining power between the two parties: 
 
sasappsap
p 2
)1(
))((maxarg*
γγ +=−−=  
 
The net benefit of the private owner, sa
2
)1( γ−
, from transferring the ownership 
(ex post) increases in quality enhancing effort a  and thus strengthens his 
incentives to improve the assets’ quality. 
 
The owner’s incentive to invest is greater when the asset is less specific. 
Asset specificity reduces the payoff if ownership is not transferred to the public 
sector when the contract expires. This compounds the hold-up problem and 
reduces the private party’s incentives, since asset specificity reduces its 
possibility to be sold otherwise.  
 
Unbundling: In this case the builder, who is also the owner, has the following 
incentive constraint: 
sa pru 2
)1( γ−
=  
  47 
The operator’s effort and optimal incentives are equal to the second-best 
results of pure agency considerations mentioned below: 
 
1
1
1
2
<
+
==
σr
ee SBu
pr
u  
 
Bundling: The consortium maximizes its expected payoff for effort levels that 
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90 
where s  is large enough to insure a positive quality enhancing effort even with 
a negative externality.91 
 
Comparing public with private ownership, the model reveals that private ownership 
always dominates public ownership, regardless of choosing bundling or unbundling. 
Further it explains that public-private partnerships (private ownership and bundling), 
strictly dominate traditional contracting (private ownership and unbundling), if and 
only if there is a positive externality between the design and the operation phase. If 
the externality is negative (compared to the case of public ownership, which has no 
effect on efforts) bundling leads now to strictly lower efforts than unbundling under 
private ownership! The incentives of the owner to invest in asset quality are lowered 
if the builder has to internalize the negative externality that asset quality has on 
operational cost.92 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Notation: 
2
~2e
 and 
2
~2a
 are the quadratic disutility functions. Service cost to the firm are 
εδθ +−−= aeC 0 , where ε  is a random variable with variance 
2σ  and mean of zero which denotes 
operational risk that the firm faces while managing the asset. 0θ  is the inborn cost of service. e denotes cost-
reducing effort and a denotes quality-enhancing effort in the build stage.  
 
91 A negative externality occurs when improving the quality of the asset increases operational costs. See pure 
agency-considerations from Iossa and Martimort (2008) below.  
92 Iossa and Martimort (2008), pp. 14-17 
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Incomplete Contracts and financing of public-private partnerships 
 
Concerning the issue of private financing in PPPs, there is a model developed by de 
Bettignies and Ross (2006) using the incomplete contracts approach. They focus 
on the privatization of the finance function since this is a much discussed 
characteristic of public-private partnerships. On one hand, many governments benefit 
from public-private partnerships because they can reduce their debt level. However, 
on the other hand, opponents of public-private partnerships object that governments 
are able to borrow with a lower interest rate than private firms and thus, the 
government should keep financing the project, at least in parts. Therefore, they want 
to find out when either public or private financing is preferable.  
 
Their model analyzes a particular project (e.g. construction and operation of a 
bridge), that can be financed and developed by either a private party or by the 
government. Either party has to find an investor to guarantee the initial capital 
required if he/she undertakes the project. The project duration is 2 periods and at 
dates 1 and 2 it produces profits and consumer surplus. The project can be ended at 
date 1, after the date 1 surpluses have been generated. In this case the assets are 
redeployed and profits of termination and consumer surplus are generated in the next 
period. The project payoffs are unknown ex ante and its ex post value depends on 
the quality of project management. Either party is of one of two types of, the “good” 
and the “bad” type. The main assumption of the model is that the probabilities of 
being good or bad are the same for private and public developers. The developer’s 
type is not known at the beginning of the project and is revealed to herself/himself 
and to the investor at date 1 when the first period payoffs are observed. It is assumed 
that if the developer is bad, termination of the project is socially optimal. In contrast, if 
the developer is from the good type, it is socially optimal to continue the project. The 
model leads to equilibriums under either form of project development, which are 
tested for ex ante and ex post (in)efficiencies.  
 
To sum up, I want to picture the most interesting results of de Bettignies and Ross 
(2006), without describing the details of the model: 
Under private project development (PPP), two problems emerge:  
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1. The private developer mainly maximizes profits. Social surplus is not 
maximized, and hence the impacts of decisions on consumer surplus are 
ignored. This may result in an inefficient continuation or termination decision 
after the first period. The government however has the incentive and the 
means93 to ensure that efficient decisions are made by the private developer 
and thus this externality has no negative impact on social surplus in 
equilibrium. This means that private development is ex post efficient. 
 
2. The second problem arises because of contractual incompleteness. For the 
investor to provide the loan to the private developer, he has to expect non-
negative returns on his investment. Loan repayment is assumed 
endogenously in this model. The private developer may have an incentive to 
“strategically default”, if the benefit from not having to make the debt 
repayment is larger than the loss of control and second period payoffs. 
Consequently, the amount the private developer can commit to repay and the 
amount a lender is content to provide in the first place, are limited. Thus, some 
projects that would be funded in a first-best world, are not funded under 
private development. Private development is ex ante inefficient. 
 
 
Under public financing, the conclusions are different. Governments in principle want 
to maximize total surplus, however they also have some self-interest. The 
government doesn’t want to reveal bad public management since if it is perceived as 
being a good manager it is more likely to be re-elected. Thus, terminating a project 
may entail political costs as it symbolizes weakness. In equilibrium, a weak 
government has an incentive to inefficiently continue projects, in order to manipulate 
the voters’ view of the government’s type. Public funding is thus ex post inefficient. 
However, ex ante inefficiency arises also for the same reason. This can also be 
described as the existence of “soft budget constraint”-inefficiencies.94 
 
Hence, private development may be ex post superior to public development because 
it leads to efficient ending of bad projects, whereas public managers may continue 
such projects in order to avoid political costs. Private funding may be preferred since 
                                                 
93 E.g. by ”subsidizing“ termination with tax revenues.  
94 See de Bettignies and Ross (2006) 
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it hardens the project budget constraint; however, projects with lower expected 
returns can only be financed by public developers, who can commit to larger debt 
repayments than private developers.95 
 
 
The term soft budget constraint, founded by Janos Kornai, was adopted from microeconomic 
theory of the household. The budget constraint is softed „when the strict relationship between 
the expenditure and the earnings of an economic unit (firm, household, etc.) has been relaxed, 
because excess expenditure will be paid by some other institution, typically be the 
paternalistic State, and when the decision-maker expects such external financial help with a 
high probability, which is included in his behaviour.96 Originally the soft budget constraint 
was first observed in in socialist economies in the 1980s in Eastern Europe and Asia, and has 
played an important role in transition economies. The soft budget constraint, however, is also 
from concern outside socialist economies.97 
 
 
According to Dewatripont and Legros (2004), the softness of budget constraints 
shows lacking commitment or a lack of completeness of contracts. They ask if 
outside financing can help to harden the budget constraint and thus can prevent 
opportunistic behavior of consortium. Problems resulting from opportunistic behavior 
can be partly diminished by auditing and monitoring. In order for this to be effective, 
the auditors and monitors must have enough knowledge about the concerning area. 
Further, sufficient incentives have to be provided for them to spend the required 
resources. Under outside financing, the investors have the stake to bear monitoring 
costs, and, if they are specialized in financing large projects, they also have the 
expertise and the prestige to be reliable monitors. Financial intermediation can be 
seen as delegated monitoring.98 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Further insights by Iossa and Martimort (2008) concerning bundling of financing and operating tasks, are 
described below. 
96 See Kornai (1986), p. 4 
97 See Dewatripont and Roland (1999), p. 2 
98 See Dewatripont and Legros (2004), p. 140 
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Asymmetric information and public-private partnerships 
 
There are a number of asymmetric information models discussing public-private 
partnerships. An overview of the models discussed in the next pages is provided in 
table 6.  
 
Table 6 Asymmetric Information Models of PPPs 
Task Bundling When is bundling of building and operation optimal? 
Model Features and Assumptions 
Bentz, Grout and Halonen 
(2005) 
• two separate equilibriums:  
low one off service set up cost 
high one off service set up cost 
• All agents are risk-neutral 
Iossa and Martimort (2008) 
• two different externality-scenarios: 
positive externality: quality-improvement reduces 
operational cost 
negative externality: quality-improvement increases 
operational cost 
• incentive constraints depend on sign of externality 
• government: risk-neutral, private firm/consortium: 
risk-averse 
Iossa and Martimort (2009) 
• slightly different purpose comparing to their previous 
paper: 
focus on transportation sector 
shows additionally how task bundling is linked with 
risk transfer 
• government: risk-neutral, private firm/consortium: 
risk-averse 
Financing When is bundling of finance and operation optimal? 
Model Features and Assumptions 
Iossa and Martimort (2008) 
• extension of their basic model 
• Modelling transaction cost: outside financiers have 
expertise to get access to some informative signal, 
which the government cannot observe. 
• Government: risk-neutral, private firm/consortium: 
risk-averse 
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Asymmetric information and Task bundling 
 
With reference to Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hart (2002), who dealt with 
PPPs under an incomplete contracts approach, there is a paper by Bentz, Grout 
and Halonen (2005) using an complete contracts approach in order to complement 
the incomplete contracts approach. They also ask for when it is advisable for the 
government to form a public-private partnership, and when it should keep to 
traditional procurement, but the difference is that they do not focus on ownership. 
They argue that ownership and the incomplete contracts approach, respectively, 
cannot fully explain the distinction of public and private for two reasons. 
First, within some PPP models, the ownership of the asset is transferred to the public 
sector upon completion, and then it is leased to the private party.99 This cannot be 
explained by the incomplete contracts. 
Second, ownership per se is only weakly emphasized by governments, when 
identifying the benefits of PPPs. Governments rather stress the fact that whoever 
builds the asset has to deal with long run consequences. 
 
Their model focuses on the role of the procurement process and rests on the strong 
assumption that contracts about asset procurement are complete.  
 
The principal characteristics of the model are as follows: 
There are two or three players, government, builder and service provider, whereby 
the builder and service provider are combined in a PPP. In the so called conventional 
model, the government, G, purchases the asset from a private builder, B, and the 
service is provided by a service provider, SP, who uses G’s asset. Every party has 
private information. They identify two asymmetric information problems: 
 
First, there is a moral hazard problem at the build stage: The quality of the asset (i.e. 
how cheap it is to operate it later on) depends partly on the investment made by the 
builder, and whether he/she has made the appropriate quality-enhancing investment 
is the builder’s private information. The government needs to create incentives at the 
build stage if it buys or builds the asset, in order to guarantee that this investment is 
made.  
                                                 
99 See BTO-Contract, Table 3.  
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Second, there is an adverse selection problem at the service provision stage. Service 
provision costs (unit cost of service provision, which can be high or low) are private 
information to the service provider. As the service provider will state the provision 
costs as high even if they are low, the government has to provide appropriate 
incentives to ensure that he/she reveals the correct costs. 
 
Further there are one-time set up costs at the service provision stage, which are 
private information to the government. The government may have information about 
these costs, for example because it may have provided that service itself in the past. 
The set up costs are revealed in equilibrium of this model. An important assumption 
is that the fixed set up costs, are large enough to ensure a separating equilibrium, 
one with low set up costs and another with high set up costs.   
 
Under conventional procurement the government has to give incentives separately to 
the builder and to the service provider. Under a PPP, however, the same party builds 
and operates the asset. Thus, given that the cost of the quality enhancing investment 
at the build stage is sufficiently low, the private party has an incentive to build the 
best asset possible since this maximizes information rent at the service provision 
stage. Consequently, under a PPP, the government doesn’t have to pay incentive 
costs to guarantee a quality enhancing investment at the build stage. A PPP is 
always the best policy if the quality enhancing investment cost at the build stage is 
low.  
 
If quality enhancing costs are high, in a PPP the government can still ensure that the 
correct build is made by increasing the payments it makes to achieve cost revelation. 
These payments are higher than would be necessary to achieve revelation if the cost 
structure could be taken as given, but a PPP is still the best approach if costs are not 
too high. Under traditional procurement the separate incentives can be designed 
specifically to each task. Once it becomes too expensive to incentivize the PPP only 
through the revelation mechanism, traditional procurement becomes superior. Thus 
PPPs are optimal when quality enhancing investments at the build stage are 
relatively cheap and the set up cost at the service provision stage are low. However, 
carrying out a PPP when government costs are high will not lead to lower costs.  
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info. rent 
1 0 P1 P0 
C 
info. rent 
1 0 P1 P0 
C 
info. rent 
1 0 P1 P0 
C 
info. rent 
1 0 P1 P0 
 
C 
increased 
This indicates that comparisons between the traditional procurement model and 
PPPs can suffer from sample selection bias. Traditional procurement should not be 
compared to PPPs, but to the costs that would be delivered by a PPP in the high cost 
scenario. Without correcting for project type, PPPs may falsely appear more efficient 
and cost effective than public sector provision. This sample selection bias is a 
problem for cross section comparisons, but should not be a problem for comparing 
activities that have been moved from the public to the private sector. However, most 
examples of activity comparisons bear on privatization and not on public-private 
partnerships.  
 
See Ill. 4 for an overview of Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005)’s results. 
 
Illustration 4100: Difference between a PPP and conventional procurement. 
 
(1) Required investment c is small: PPP preferred 
Conventional: public-private partnership: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Required investment c is large: Conventional procurement preferred 
Conventional: public-private partnership: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0P  is the probability that the asset is efficient regardless of who builds it. )1( 1p− is the probability of 
the asset to be inefficient. With the probability 01( pp − ), the asset will be inefficient, unless whoever 
                                                 
100 See Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005), p.21 
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builds it makes an investment of cost c, in which case the asset will then be efficient. These 
probabilities and the investment cost c, are common knowledge.  
 
In (1), under PPP, the government pays only the information rent to the service 
provider, while under conventional provision, G has to pay the same information rent 
plus )( 21 ppc −  to the builder as an incentive for the quality enhancing investment. A 
PPP is obviously cheaper for the government. In (2), when c is larger, G can 
generate the quality enhancing investment only by raising the transfer in the 
revelation mechanism. The higher c or the closer 0p  to 1p , the more attractive is 
conventional provision to the government.  
 
Corresponding to the objective of my thesis I want to picture more precisely the case 
of public-private partnership with low set up cost, which is an optimum according to 
Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005):101 
 
G buys the service from the private sector consortium (PC), which is responsible for 
building the asset and providing the service. The government offers a refined 
contract102 to the private sector consortium, by which the PC learns pre-contractual 
information about the project’s characteristics, which are the service set up cost and 
whether efficiency improvements need to me made at the build stage. The contract is 
the standard, second-best (truth-telling), contract under adverse selection, and allows 
the PC to obtain information rent whenever service provision cost is low. The 
incentive for the PC to invest in efficient assets is determined by the size of the 
information rent. The standard information rent required to oblige truth-telling is 
sufficient to implement optimal investment as well. 
 
Notations:  
The unit cost of service provision is denoted as θ~ . If the asset is efficient, eθθ =
~
, if 
the asset is inefficient, iθθ =
~
, with ei θθ >  and ei θθθ −≡∆ .The demand curve q is a 
continuous, and continuously differentiable function. )( ee qq θ= , )( ii qq θ=  
                                                 
101 See Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005), p. 15 
102 A “refined” contract is defined as a contract which provides precise specifications of the project and thus 
reveals G’s private information, while a “generic” contract doesn’t reveal this information.  
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and ie qqq −≡∆ .The service set up cost is denoted as f
~
, { }ff ,0~∈ , with π== )0~Pr( f  
and π−== 1)~Pr( ff .  
 
The distribution over θ~  is known to be { }))1(,(),,( pp ie −θθ , where p can either be 
0p or 1p .depending on whether the investment was made. 
The G’s objective is the maximization of net consumer surplus tskqkqv −−−))(( , 
where (.)v  denotes gross consumer surplus dxxqqv
q
)()(
0
1∫ −= , s  denotes subsidies to 
the private consortium and t  denotes other net transfers from the government. 
 
Under PPP, the government designs a refined contract, a schedule of subsidies 
),( ie ss  for the PC so as to solve the following problem. 
 
[ ] [ ]iiiieeee
ss
sqqvpsqqvp
ie
−−−+−− θθ )()1()(max
,
 
 
s.t. 
(1) ieiiie sqqs +−≥ θθ  incentive compatibility constraint (low cost type provider) 
(2) eieeei sqqs +−≥ θθ  incentive compatibility constraint (high cost type provider) 
(3) 0≥es  participation constraint (low cost type provider) 
(4) 0≥is  participation constraint (high cost type provider) 
 
As id explained standard, constraints (1) and (4) are binding in equilibrium, while (2) 
and (3) are unbinding.  
 
The second-best subsidies are thus characterized by 
 0=is  and  
 θ∆= ie qs ,  
where θ∆iq  is the amount of information rent extracted by SP if the unit cost is low. 
 
The government’s payoff in this case is: 
[ ] [ ]iiiieee qqvpqqqvppV θθθ −−+∆−−≡ )()1()()(  
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Subsidies (more precisely, the difference )( ie ss − ) control the incentive to make the 
efficiency enhancing investment. Thus G may find it optimal to increase es  beyond 
θ∆= ie qs , if the loss from increased rent is outbalanced by the gain due to an 
increased probability of obtaining an efficient asset. Increasing es  doesn’t distort 
incentive compatibility, as long as θ∆+≤ eie qss . As augmenting is  does not increase 
the investment incentive, we know that 0=is . Thus the highest subsidy G can give to 
PC is θ∆= ee qs . G’s payoff from raising information rent up to es
~ is 
[ ] [ ]iiieeeeeI qqvpsqqvpspV θθ −−+−−≡ )()1(~)()~,(  
 
Now, they ask how far the government is prepared to raise information rent if that 
increase causes investment. The information rent, which is paid with probability 1p , 
above the standard information rent θ∆iq , which is paid with probability 0p , is 
profitable if it is less or equal to the expected gain in net consumer surplus 
[ ])()()()( 01 iieeie qqqvqvpp θθ −−−− . 
 
In conclusion, Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005) developed their main proposition 
about investments in the public-private partnership model: 
If the government chooses the PPP model then it wants to generate investment up to 
an investment cost of 
[ ] [ ] θθθ ∆+−−−−−= iiieeie qp
p
qq
p
pp
qvqv
p
pp
c
1
0
1
01
1
01 )()( 103 
 
 
Iossa and Martimort (2008) developed a multi-task moral-hazard model to study the 
conditions under which bundling of the project phase, in other words, undertaking a 
PPP, is optimal. In distinction from Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005), within their 
model, two alternative externality scenarios are particularly analyzed.104  
 
                                                 
103See Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005) for the formal proof and further explanations. 
104 In the id model, Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2005) differentiate equilibria with high and low set up costs. 
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In the case of a positive externality, 0>δ , a quality improvement of the asset also 
reduces the operational costs. This can be for instance that the design of a prison 
with better sightlines for staff that improves security may also reduce the required 
number of security guards. In contrast, a negative externality, 0<δ , occurs when 
improving the quality of the asset increases operational costs. For example, 
innovative design of a hospital may lead to better clinical outcomes (due to e.g. 
improved lighting and air quality), but may also increase maintenance costs.105 
 
Unbundling:  
 
The operator receives a linear cost-reimbursement in the form of CCt βα −=)( 106. 
1=β  holds for a fixed price, while 0=β  is equivalent of a cost-plus contract which 
gives no incentives for cost reduction. It is assumed that the builder obtains a fixed 
payment. 
Thus, the builder does not exert any quality-enhancing effort: 
0=ua  
The operator maximizes the certainty equivalent107 of his expected utility. Given the 
builder’s effort, Iossa and Martimort (2008) write the operator’s incentive constraint 
as: 
ββσθβα =−−−−=
22
~
)~(maxarg
222
0~
re
ee
e
108 
 
A power increase of the incentive scheme β  boosts cost-reducing effort, but also 
causes an increase of the risk premium 
2
22βσr
since more operational risk is then 
                                                 
105 These differenciation is interesting to compare to Hart (2002)’s productive and unproductive investment.  
106 C stands for the operation costs. 
107 Definition:”The amount of payoff (e.g. money or utility) that an agent would have to receive to be indifferent 
between that payoff and a given gamble is called that gamble's 'certainty equivalent'. For a risk averse agent (as 
most are assumed to be) the certainty equivalent is less than the expected value of the gamble because the agent 
prefers to reduce uncertainty).”(See http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/certainty.htm) 
108 Notation: 
2
~2e
 and 
2
~2a
 are the quadratic disutility functions. Service cost to the firm are 
εδθ +−−= aeC 0 , where ε  is a random variable with variance 
2σ  and mean of zero which denotes 
operational risk that the firm faces while managing the asset. 0θ  is the inborn cost of service. e denotes cost-
reducing effort. 
  59 
transferred to the agent. The fee α is just set to cover the risk premium that a risk-
averse operator has to receive so that he bears some operational risk. 
 
The government maximizes social welfare factoring in both incentive constraints and 
the total benefit and cost of effort, including the risk premium. 109 
 
 
Bundling:  
 
The consortium jointly selects both types of efforts in order to maximize its expected 
payoff. 
 
22
~
2
~
)~~(maxarg),(
2222
)~,~(
βσδθβα reaaeae
ae
−−−−−−=  
 
The incentive constraints (assuming that 0≥a ) depend on the sign of the externality: 
 
β=e  



=
0
βδ
a   if 
0
0
≤
>
δ
δ
 
 
Their results are intuitionally easy to understand: 
Under a negative externality, the consortium never chooses to make a quality-
enhancing effort because it receives no direct reward for doing so and it raises its 
own operating cost. In this case, bundling and unbundling yield the same welfare. 
There is no quality enhancing effort and the cost reducing effort is less than optimal. 
With a positive externality, however, the private consortium internalizes the impact of 
building a high quality asset. A fixed price contract also raises incentives on 
infrastructure quality enhancing. Thus, in this case, bundling strictly dominates 
unbundling (in terms of social welfare). In equilibrium, there is a positive quality 
enhancing effort and an increase in cost reducing effort.  
 
                                                 
109 See Iossa and Martimort (2008), pp. 9-10 
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Iossa and Martimort (2009) have a slightly different purpose, comparing to their 
previous paper. They deal with contractual and incentive issues, concerning PPPs in 
the transportation sector, by means of Theory of Incentives. Regarding task bundling 
they show how a PPP can induce quality-enhancing effort and a long-term 
perspective of the contractor as well as how task bundling is linked with risk transfer.  
 
 
The Model:  
 
The demand of the transportation service is stochastic and influenced by 
infrastructure-quality and by the consortium’s effort at the provision stage. For 
example, the benefit of highway users is contingent to the rout safety and hence 
depends on quality of the asset and also on the exerted maintenance effort. 
Transport projects are affected at the operation stage by e.g. technology risks, 
traffic/revenue risks, interest rate and foreign exchange risks. These risks can be 
predicted, but even though the forecasts are credible, there are some other factors 
that can hardly be prognosticated, like e.g. competition from other facilities, changing 
user needs, and general macroeconomic circumstances. 
 
It is assumed that the users have an inelastic demand up to a price level 0p : 


 +++
=
0
)( 0
ηedad
pD    if   
0
0
pp
pp
>
≤
 where a denotes the infrastructure quality-
enhancing effort and e  is the effort in service quality. The marginal benefit of teh 
agent’s efforts are positive: 0≥d . 00 ≥d  is the demand obtained without any effort.  
The quality-enhancing efforts have disutility terms of 
2
2a
 and 
2
2e
, without 
(dis)economies of scope between the two kinds of effort.  
To simplify matters, marginal costs of providing the service are assumed to be zero. 
 
Although in fact service quality of transportation is largely observable and verifiable 
by third parties, the authors concentrate on non contractible quality. The government 
is assumed to be risk-neutral110 and to maximize expected social welfare, defined as 
                                                 
110 This assumption makes most sense where the transport project is relatively small in comparison with the 
entire budget share of the transportation agency.  
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the social benefit of the service minus its costs and of the payment mad to the 
consortium. The private partner maximizes his expected profit and is risk-averse.111  
 
At the first-best, the government fully insures the firm. Both efforts are observable 
and contractible, and the firm exerts first-best efforts: 
 
( ) ),(
22
)(maxarg, 00
22
0
),(
pdp
ea
eddpea ao
ea
FBFB =−−++=  
 
Unbundling:  
As in Iossa and Martimort (2008), described above, the operator receives a linear 
payment in the form of: CCt βα −=)( .  The possibility that the builder receives an 
incentive payment that depends on the observed demand D  is excluded from 
analysis.112The builder obtains a fixed payment and thus does not make any effort: 
0=ua  
 
The operator then, considering the builder’s effort, faces an incentive constraint of: 
 
0
0
222
00~ 22
~
)~(maxarg p
pre
edpe
e
β
βσ
βα =−−−−=  
 
Similar to Iossa and Martimort (2008), a power increase of the incentive scheme β  
boosts demand-enhancing effort, but also causes an increase of the risk premium 
2
22βσr
since more operational risk is then transferred to the agent The fee α is just 
set to cover the risk premium that a risk-averse operator has to receive so that he 
bears some operational risk. 
 
The government maximizes social welfare, which is its objective in this model, 
factoring in both incentive constraints and the total benefit and cost of effort, including 
the risk premium: 
 
                                                 
111 Assuming risk-adversity of the firm accounts for the fact that a PPP-project may represent a large share of 
this firm’s activity.   
112 This is for simplicity and also because it corresponds to empirical observations of the transportation sector. 
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22
)(max 0
222
00
pre
edp
e
βσ
−−+  subject to the operator’s incentive constraint. 
 
The resulting second-best effort and marginal reward is written as follows: 
 
2
0
0 1 σ
β
r
p
pe SBSBu +
==  
 
The second-best effort is less than the first-best effort. This is due to the socially 
costly additional risk the agent is induced to accept by incentivizing him.  
 
Social welfare is defined as: 
)1(2 2
2
0
00 σr
p
dpW SBu +
+=  
 
It is important to notice that an increase in demand risk - 2σ  rises – results in a lower 
second-best effort incentives and in a lower social welfare. One of Iossa and 
Martimort’s results is that the optimal payment mechanism tends to be based on user 
charges when risk-aversion and demand risk are small, when incentives are 
powerful, respectively. In contrast, the payment mechanism is prone to be based on 
availability when risk-aversion and demand risk are large (low-powered incentives). If 
demand risk is transferred to the contractor, he is incentivized to raise demand and 
consumer surplus. On the other hand, transferring risk to the operator raises the 
government’s cost (risk-premium).  
 
Bundling: 
In this case, a consortium builds and operates the asset. The consortium chooses 
efforts a  and e  to maximize its expected payoff: 
 
22
~
2
~
)~~(maxarg),(
2
0
2222
00
)~,~(
prea
eaddpae
ae
βσ
βα −−−+++=  
 
Non-negativity constraint: 0≥a  
Incentive constraints: 0pe β=  
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 dedpa == 0β  
 
The incentive constraint for e  is the same as in the unbundling-case. However, the 
effort a  is now greater than under unbundling because the consortium internalizes 
the positive externality of building a high quality asset.  
 
The government now maximizes a social welfare-function, which includes the non-
negative a : 
 
222
)(max
2
0
222
2
00
),(
prea
edadp
ea
βσ
−−−++  subject to the id incentive constraints. 
 
The resulting level of welfare 
)1(2
)1(
22
22
0
00 σrd
dp
dpW SBb ++
+
+=  is greater than SBuW . 
Thus bundling strictly dominates unbundling. 
 
The equilibrium values of effort show that under PPP, the incentives are more 
powerful and there is more operational risk transferred (risk-premiums are higher) to 
the private partner than under traditional public procurement: 
 
SB
u
SB
b ee =  
SB
u
SB
b
SB
b adpa >= 0β  
 
 
Asymmetric information and financing of public-private partnerships 
 
Concerning the aspect that many public-private partnerships are of the DBFO- type 
(design-build-finance-operate), it is interesting to concentrate on private sector 
financing113. The question is: What are the effects of private funding on incentives? 
 
Dewatripont and Legros (2004) discuss positive and negative effects of external 
financing of PPP-project. Their reference point is traditional corporate finance 
                                                 
113 See also id considerations on this topic from de Bettignies and Ross (2006). 
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literature, as for example, Jensen and Meckling (1979) and Myers (1977), which 
states that large outside equity or debt can lower incentives to exert effort because 
the external investors profit of parts of the effort.  
 
Starting from the result that because the builder does not internalize the effect of his 
effort on the consumers’ willingness to pay, traditional procurement does not lead to 
the optimal effort *e , while by bundling and private ownership of the asset, the 
consortium can be induced to choose the optimal effort *e .114 
 
Now they examine the case where bundling also concerns the financing of the PPP-
project. The consortium has to buy and finance the project. In order to do so it has to 
find a external financiers (unless it has sufficient funds), which means that part of the 
project’s return will flow to the external investor. Adding a third partner thus 
introduces a new agency problem, which exists between the consortium and the 
outside investor.  
This can have the negative effect that the consortium, seeking external financing, 
may not choose the socially optimal effort *e . Outside financing can undo the 
desirable incentive effect that can be obtained by bundling of building and operation 
of the asset. A more precise explanation of this effect is provided by Iossa and 
Martimort (2008), as demonstrated below. 
 
Regarding the performance of PPPs, if the consortium is financially limited, the risk of 
bankruptcy is not internalized in the contract award process. At the auction stage, 
this can result in aggressive bidding, success of the consortium, and 
government/sponsor’s responsibility for the consequences.115 
 
 
Iossa and Martimort (2008) state two important characteristics.  
First, PPP projects are attractive for financiers because those investments are noted 
for providing stable returns, which are largely uncorrelated with the market.  
                                                 
114 They consider the most favourable situation for a PPP; the existence of a positive externality and the absence 
of multitask problems like e.g. cost-cutting efforts that have a quality-reducing effect (Hart 2002). 
115 See Dewatripont and Legros (2004), pp. 136-139 
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Second, public-private partnerships are able to introduce the expertise of outside 
financiers in evaluating risks.  
To account for these possible advantages of private financing, the authors focus on 
the benefit of bundling operation and financing. They build on their basic moral 
hazard model116 and assume that there are no social benefits of designing a better 
infrastructure: 0=b  
In order to model transaction costs that may arise when the operator seeks outside 
finance, it is assumed that financiers have expertise to get access to some 
informative signal y  on the contractor’s effort: η+= ey , where e denotes the agent’s 
effort in cost reduction activities and η  is a random variable which is assumed to be 
normally distributed with variance ησ 2  and a mean of zero.  
 
Under public finance, the government doesn’t observe the informative signal y  and 
makes only the second-best effort. 
Under outside finance the operator has full control over his access to the financial 
market and over operations. The operator receives the same payment scheme as 
before: CCt βα −=)( . The contract between the private partner and the government 
is observable by outside financiers and thus the contractor and those financiers 
concur on risk-sharing of the remaining risk.  
A possible general linear scheme for repayment to the outside financiers is 
determined: 
yCEyCz )))(1(),( ξβαγ −−−+= , where yξ , with 0>ξ , is bonus in case that y  is 
high enough and γ  is the part of the firm’s reward that remains with the operator. E  
is a fixed payment in the amount of the equity the competitive financiers hold in the 
project net of investment cost  
 
                                                 
116 This basic model, accounting only for bundling of building and operating, is described above in the previos 
chapter. 
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The new operator’s incentive constraint is written as: 
ξβγ
ξσβγσδθβαγ +=−−−+−−+−=
222
~
~))~((maxarg
222222
0~
n
e
rre
eeEe 117 
 
This constraint shows, first, that only a part of the incentives given by the government 
turns out to promote effort (due to the risk-sharing), and, second, that financiers can 
enhance incentives by stipulating the repayment of the operator on the observed 
informative signal on the operator’s effort.  
 
Iossa and Martimort’s result is that bundling private financing and operation is optimal 
when outside financiers can observe some informative signal on the operator’s effort 
level. The incentive power increases and welfare improves in comparison with public 
finance.118Intuitively, this result can be explained easily: Outside financing causes the 
operator to be less risk-averse. The financing contract is made under a better 
information structure and thus making an additional contract with financiers has more 
benefits based on improved incentives than costs related to modified risk-sharing.119 
 
 
                                                 
117 In the id basic moral hazard model the operators incentive constraint was β=e  
118 See Iossa and Martimort (2008), p. 27 
119 See Iossa and Martimort (2008), pp. 25-27 also for further formal explanations 
  67 
 
Summary of results 
 
Task bundling 
 
Probably the most important advantage of providing public service by means of a 
public-private partnership is that the consortium may internalize the positive 
externality of building a high quality asset on the operation stage. This is due to the 
fact that under PPP the same firm/consortium builds and operates the asset. Under 
which circumstances, however is public service provision by a PPP, task bundling, 
respectively, preferable? 
 
Authors have dealt with task bundling using two different approaches – asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracts.  
 
An incomplete contracts model, distinguishing two kinds of investment the builder 
can make, shows that under unbundling the amount of productive investment is too 
low, but the unproductive investment has the right amount. On the other hand, under 
bundling the builder spends more (but still too little) on the productive investment, but 
also more on the unproductive investment.  
The conclusion is that unbundling is preferable if the quality of the building can be 
well specified in the initial contract, but service quality cannot be. In contrast, public-
private partnership is beneficial if service quality can be well specified, or more 
generally if performance is easily measurable (which makes it possible to reward or 
penalize the service provider), and quality of the facility cannot be.120 
 
 
From the asymmetric information point of view, it is clear that under traditional 
procurement, the government has to give different incentives to the builder and the 
service provider, while under PPP the private party has an incentive to build the best 
asset possible as this maximizes information rent at the service provision stage. 
                                                 
120 See Hart (2002) 
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Consequently, a PPP is the best policy if quality-enhancing investment cost at the 
build stage is low. 
Once it becomes too expensive to incentivize the PPP only through the revelation 
mechanism, traditional procurement becomes superior 
However, carrying out a PPP when government costs are high will not lead to lower 
costs.  
This indicates that comparisons between the traditional procurement model and 
PPPs can suffer from sample selection bias.121 
 
 
A further model, which analyzed two alternative externality scenarios, concerning the 
effect of quality improvement on operational costs, yields the following results:  
Under a negative externality, the consortium never chooses to make a quality-
enhancing effort because it receives no direct reward for doing so and it raises its 
own operating cost. In this case, bundling and unbundling yields the same welfare. 
There is no quality enhancing effort and the cost reducing effort is less than optimal.  
With a positive externality, however, the private consortium internalizes the impact of 
building a high quality asset. A fixed price contract also raises incentives on 
infrastructure quality enhancing. Thus, in this case, bundling strictly dominates 
unbundling, in terms of social welfare.122 
 
Regarding to the payment mechanism of public-private partnerships, it can be said 
that the optimal payment mechanism tends to be based on user charges when risk-
aversion and demand risk are small, when incentives are powerful, respectively. In 
contrast, the payment mechanism is prone to be based on availability when risk-
aversion and demand risk are large (low-powered incentives).123 
 
 
A further asymmetric information model also shows that bundling strictly dominates 
unbundling, based on social welfare. According to the equilibrium values of effort, 
under bundling, the incentives are more powerful and there is more operational risk 
                                                 
121 See Benz, Grout and Halonen (2005) 
122 See Iossa and Martimort (2008) 
123 See Iossa and Martimort (2009) 
  69 
transferred (risk-premiums are higher) to the private partner than under traditional 
public procurement.124 
 
 
An incomplete contracts model, concerning the comparison between public and 
private ownership and alternative externality scenarios, reveals that private 
ownership always dominates public ownership, regardless of choosing bundling or 
unbundling. Further it explains that public-private partnerships (private ownership and 
bundling), strictly dominate traditional contracting (private ownership and 
unbundling); if and only if there is a positive externality between the design and the 
operation phase. 
If the externality is negative (compared to the case of public ownership, which has no 
effect on efforts) bundling leads now to strictly lower efforts than unbundling under 
private ownership. The incentives of the owner to invest in asset quality are lowered 
if the builder has to internalize the negative externality that asset quality has on 
operational cost.125 
 
 
Private Financing 
 
The typical public-private partnership contract is a DBFO-type (design-build-finance-
operate), where task bundling also includes financing of the project. What are the 
effects of private financing and under which circumstances is privatization of project-
financing advisable? 
 
Compared to the task-bundling topic, there are significantly less papers concerning 
the private financing aspect of public-private partnerships.  
 
From the asymmetric information perspective it was stated that the consortium has to 
find an external financiers (unless it has sufficient funds), which means that part of 
the project’s return will flow to the external investor. Adding a third partner thus 
                                                 
124 See Iossa and Martimort (2009) 
125See Iossa and Martimort (2008) 
  70 
introduces a new agency problem, which exists between the consortium and the 
outside investor.  
This can have the negative effect that the consortium seeking external financing may 
not choose the socially optimal effort. Outside financing can undo the desirable 
incentive effect that can be obtained by bundling of building and operation of the 
asset.126 Due to the risk-sharing between the consortium and the private financier 
only a part of the incentives given by the government turns out to promote effort. 
Bundling private financing and operation is optimal when outside financiers can 
observe some informative signal on the operator’s effort level. The incentive power 
increases and welfare improves in comparison with public finance. Intuitively, this 
result can be explained easily: Outside financing causes the operator to be less risk-
averse. The financing contract is made under a better information structure and thus 
making an additional contract with financiers has more benefits based on improved 
incentives than costs related to modified risk-sharing.127 
 
 
An incomplete contracts model reveals that private financing (PPP) is ex post 
superior to public financing because it leads to efficient ending of bad projects, 
whereas public managers may continue such projects in order to avoid political costs. 
Private funding may be preferred since it hardens the project’s budget constraint. 
However, on the other hand, projects with lower expected returns can only be 
financed by public administrations, which can commit to larger debt repayments than 
private developers. Private financing (PPP) is ex ante inefficient.128 
 
 
Empirical evidence 
 
 
In order to complete the picture of public-private partnerships it is interesting to see 
which observations are made of existing public-private partnership projects and how 
they perform in comparison to traditional public sector procurement.  
                                                 
126 See Dawatripont and Legros (2004) 
127 See Iossa and Martimort (2008) 
128 See de Bettignies and Ross (2006) 
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The author’s evaluating statements are highly contrary. Some authors conclude PPP-
project’s performance as better in comparison to traditional public sector 
procurement while others can not find any empirical evidence of the expected 
advantages of public-private partnerships.  
 
 
According to Hodge and Greve (2007), an encompassing evaluation of public-private 
partnership projects would call for assessments of all the different types of PPPs. 
Their paper, as well as e.g. the Mot Mac Donald Report, focuses on PPP-projects of 
the PFI type. So as to find out if PPP-projects have been internationally successful, 
they start from the two main advantage-expectations of public-private partnerships: 
First, through private financing it should be possible for the government to move 
resources to other (more important) policy areas. Second, PPPs yield better value for 
money than traditional procurement.  
Regarding to the first promise the empirical evidence shows a negative result. 
Empirical papers from the 1990s show that there was neither a reduction of public 
budget pressure nor an increase in provided infrastructure. Only in the case where 
users/citizens pay directly for the use of the infrastructure, pressure on public 
budgets is reduced. Concerning the second expected advantage, Hodge and Greve 
(2007) picture extensively the opposing international research results. On one hand 
PFI projects are stated to be “delivered on time”, to “deliver construction risk 
successfully”, and to “cause considerable design innovations”. Proponents of PFIs 
also detect “cost savings of 10 to 30 percent, due to the calculus of risk transfers 
from the public to the private sector”. On the other hand, many authors state that PFI-
projects are more expensive than conventionally financed projects. Further they 
mention e.g. a lack of accountability which makes it difficult to learn from past 
experiences and moreover the difficulty of capturing transaction costs in comparisons 
between PFIs and traditional project delivery. Thus, in principal we can say that the 
anticipated economic and financial benefits of public-private partnerships are not 
approved and are still to be analyzed, respectively. Despite everything, empirical 
evidence suggests that PPP-projects in some sectors like roads and bridges have 
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performed better than projects in other sectors and that PPPs are not suitable for 
sectors like information technology. 129 
 
 
Regarding transaction costs, it was found out that PPP-projects tend to have a longer 
procurement process and are marked by higher bidding-costs than traditional 
procurement. Bidding costs were estimated to be about 5-10% of the project costs130 
and the average duration of the bidding process is about 34 months (for PFI-projects 
that closed between 2004 and 2006).131 As these transaction costs are largely 
independent of the project-size, public-private partnerships are not suitable for small 
projects. These costs and risks of bidding for PPP-projects, in many cases is an 
obstacle for small construction companies to participate.  
 
 
Vining and Boardman (2008) made a case study of 10 projects 132(from different 
areas like highways and bridges but also schools and wastewater treatment facilities) 
in Canada. They tested whether PPPs have lower total costs, which is the 
appropriate test from a social perspective. Total costs are composed of production 
costs and all transaction costs and externalities associated with managing external 
suppliers. The main result of this study is that transaction cost associated with ex 
ante or ex post contracting is regularly the cause for the government’s inability to 
reduce total costs. Further, in many cases governments were not able to reduce their 
budgetary risk exposure by service provision through PPP. Their results suggest that 
the social desirability of the widespread use of PPPs for public infrastructure 
provision has to be questioned. However, they found some circumstances under 
which PPPs in Canada have performed acceptably. First, when governments have 
not tried to transfer demand-risk or revenue-risk to the private partner. The second 
circumstance is that projects have required specialized knowledge or means that are 
only possessed by private firms, and third, when governments were able to transfer 
construction risk at an almost fixed price. These circumstances, however, 
                                                 
129 See Hodge and Greve (2007), pp.548-553 
130 See Yescombe (2007), p. 107 
131 See NAO (2007), p 16 
132 They do not characterize this sample as unbiased. 
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substantially describe a classic design-build-transfer or build-transfer contract rather 
than a PPP-contract.133 
 
 
A report by order of the Treasury Taskforce, concerning the value for money of PFI-
projects shows positive results: Anderson Arthur and Enterprise LSE (2000) 
estimated that the average percentage estimated 17% savings for a sample of British 
PFI projects comparing to traditional procurement projects. Thus the PFI appears to 
offer excellent value for money. 
 
 
A rather dark picture of PFIs in Great Britain is communicated by Pollock, Price and 
Player (2007). More precisely they examine the cost and time overrun data that has 
been used as evidence base for five different studies which form the basis of the UK 
government procurement policy. According to the Treasury, the PFI has decreased 
cost and time overruns in public provision projects. Reviewing the empirical studies 
they find some important methodical shortages concerning the way they have been 
conducted. The first “source of error” is overlooking significant differences between 
the subjects in the comparison, which could account for observed cost and time 
overruns. As examples for these significant differences they mention diverging 
project-type sample structure, and time periods in which projects were carried out.  
Further problems occurring in these empirical studies are: Representativeness of 
sample, sample size (the sample has to be large enough), and measurement bias134. 
The authors claim that only one135 of the five studies provides comparative data that 
serves to analyze the relative performance of PFI and traditional procurement. This 
study, however, suffers the id measurement and sampling shortages, which makes 
the results impossible to interpret. Thus Treasury guidance is biased towards 
recommending PFIs.136 
 
 
                                                 
133 See Vining and Boardman (20008), pp.11, 34-39 
134 This emerges when different baselines are used for the comparison between the two groups 
135 They refer to Mot MacDonald (2002), Review of Large Public Procurement in the UK (Treasury, London) 
136 See Pollock, Price and Player (2007), pp. 127-133 
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Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith and Välilä (2006) compared the ex ante construction costs of 
PPP-projects (DBFO-type) with traditional procurement. Their sample consists of 
road projects in the EU-15 countries (and Norway), financed by the EIB between 
1990 and 2005. Their estimations show that, on average, ex ante construction cost of 
a European road-PPP-project is 24% higher than conventional public procurement of 
roads.  
Further they mention some explanations of what this difference can represent: 
 
• Higher investment of the PPP-consortium in the construction phase to obtain 
cost savings in the operation phase.  
• Increased price because of the construction risk, which is transferred to the 
private sector partner. 
• Necessity to recover higher bidding costs by PPP- contractors. 
• Lower competition in the PPP-market. 
• Corruption in the award procedure of PPP-projects.137 
 
 
Concerning the effects of ownership structure, there is a study by Oum, Adler, and 
Yu (2006), which have investigated the effects of forms of ownership and 
management structure on the performance of airports. Their sample consists of 116 
airports all over the world of different sizes, ownership and governance structures. 
The dependent variable is a Variable Factor Productivity (VFP) measure, which is the 
ratio of total aggregate output over aggregate variable input. 
Surprisingly they found that entirely public (by a single government) owned airports 
are more efficient than the PPP-airports, where a government keeps majority 
ownership and control.  
Airports with a government majority and/or with multiple government involvement 
have significantly lower operating efficiency on average than airports of all other 
ownership forms.138 
 
                                                 
137 See Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith and Välilä (2006), pp.12-29 
138 See Oum, Adler, and Yu (2006) 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In my thesis I have pictured the most important incentive issues between the two 
parties forming a public-private partnership. I have focused on two of the main 
characteristics which distinguish public-private partnership arrangements from 
conventional contracting-out: task bundling (building stage and provision stage), and 
private project financing.  
Public-private partnerships are evaluated with means of two different theoretical 
approaches. On one side, PPP-arrangements are stated to face the problem of 
incomplete contracts, while on the other side, the agency-theory focuses on 
informational asymmetries between the contractors.  
 
In summary, it can be said that economic theory gives no clear answer to the 
question of efficiency. Only under certain circumstances service provision through 
public-private partnership is more efficient than traditional public sector 
procurement.139 There exists no universal recipe for the application of PPPs. 
Dependent on project type/features, area of application, and prevailing market 
conditions, the applicability of PPP has to be considered separately for every project.  
Thus, cross-section comparisons between traditional procurement projects and PPP-
projects can suffer from sample selection bias. 
 
Empirical studies on the efficiency of public-private partnerships are not scarce, but 
unfortunately do not show any uniform picture. Empirical findings are very contrary 
regarding the efficiency gains of public service provision through PPP-arrangements, 
which is partly due to measurement- and data problems. Further as a result of the 
long duration of PPP-projects a conclusive performance measurement is not 
achievable yet. 
 
Apart from the topics I elaborated, there are some further contractual issues in 
public-private partnerships, dealt with sparsely in economic literature. The first issue, 
due to the typical long duration of PPP-projects (about 20-35 years), is the trade-off 
                                                 
139 See the id summarization of results. 
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between investment and maintenance. Since the quality of durable infrastructures 
may decrease significantly, the contractor may not want to make quality-enhancing 
investments in order to improve the infrastructure in the long-run, but rather prefers to 
maintain project-costs low in the short-run.  
The second issue are regulatory and political risks which may affect contract 
design.140 
 
Iossa and Martimort (2008 and 2009) mention three suggestions for future research. 
Firstly, an analysis of the procurement process for public-private partnership projects. 
As above-mentioned, empirical findings show that the procurement process for PPPs 
is costly and time-robbing. Since a typical PPP-contract covers design, building, 
financing and operation of the asset, the award procedure requires communication 
between the procurement authority and the bidders, and a sophisticated valuation 
system for quality and cost dimensions.  
Secondly, the internal organization of the public sphere and its consequences on the 
composition of the public entities involved deciding on public demand. The third issue 
is the possible collusive behavior between the government agency and the firm.  
 
De Bettignies and Ross (2006) bring up two, often mentioned, important 
characteristics of PPPs that they have not taken into account in their model 
concerning private funding of PPP-projects. First, the private sector may be more 
innovative, and may have lower production costs. Second, the government may be 
confronted with a loss of control over decisions made by managers of the 
firm/consortium.  
                                                 
140 See e.g. Iossa and Martimort (2008) and  Iossa and Martimort (2009). 
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Appendix A: Abstract 
 
 
Public-private Partnership (PPPs), a specific form of task fulfillment of 
administrations, has become increasingly popular over the last few years in many 
parts of the world as well as in Austria. 
A public-private partnership can be seen as an alternative to conventional public 
sector procurement. The government specifies only the outputs, which are to be 
provided by the infrastructure facility, but does not specify how these outputs should 
be supplied. A private firm/consortium is contracted to participate at different stages 
in the project (design, build, operate, finance). It receives payments (set already ex 
ante) over the life of the PPP-contract, which are supposed to repay the funding 
costs and create a return for the investors. Risks, traditionally borne by the public 
sector, are transferred to the private partner.  
Public administrations, naturally, expect advantages of this form of public service 
provision, but do PPPs really work better? 
There are two theoretical approaches that can be applied to public-private 
partnerships, focusing on strategic interactions between the partners. On one hand 
the contract is likely to be incomplete and thus the relationship can be described by 
means of transaction costs theory and theory of incomplete contracts, respectively. 
On the other hand, assuming complete contracts, the partnership can be described 
as a classic Principal-Agent relationship where the existence of information 
asymmetries causes distorting phenomena like moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Economic theory and empiric studies provide inconclusive results concerning 
efficiency gains through service provision by public-private partnerships. Only under 
certain circumstances service provision through public-private partnership is more 
efficient than traditional public sector procurement.  
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Appendix B: Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Public-private partnership (öffentlich-private Partnerschaft) als besondere Form der 
öffentlichen Aufgabenerfüllung, erfreut sich, seit einigen Jahren, zunehmender 
Beliebtheit in vielen Teilen der Welt, sowie auch in Österreich.  
Der große Unterschied zu herkömmlichen Formen der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe 
ist, dass bei einem public-private partnership (PPP) eine einzige private Firma bzw. 
ein Konsortium für Planung, Errichtung, Betrieb und in vielen Fällen auch für die 
Finanzierung des Infrastrukturprojektes zuständig ist. Die öffentliche Verwaltung 
spezifiziert nur die Leistung die bereitgestellt werden soll und nicht wie dies erreicht 
werden soll. Das Konsortium erhält, schon ex ante festgelegte, Zahlungen über die 
gesamte Vertragsdauer, die Finanzierungskosten zurückerstatten und Gewinn für 
den privaten Partner erzeugen sollen. Auf den privaten Partner werden Risiken 
transferiert, die traditionellerweise der öffentliche Sektor trägt. Öffentliche 
Verwaltungen versprechen sich einige Vorteile von dieser Form der öffentlichen 
Aufgabenerfüllung. Führen public-private partnerships, jedoch, zu effizienteren 
Ergebnissen als herkömmliche Formen der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe? 
Die strategische Interaktion zwischen den beiden Vertragspartnern lässt sich mit 
Hilfe zweier theoretischer Ansätze dargestellt. Das sind zum einen die Theorie der 
unvollständigen Verträge und zum anderen die Incentivetheorie wo vollständige 
Verträge angenommen werden und die Existenz von Informationsasymmetrien zu 
verzerrenden Phänomenen wie moral hazard und adverse Selektion führen. Die 
ökonomische Theorie, sowie empirische Studien, liefern keine klare Antwort auf die 
Frage der Effizienz. Nur unter bestimmten Umständen ist die Leistungserbringung 
durch ein public-private partnership effizienter als durch traditionelle Formen der 
öffentlichen Vergabe. 
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